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ABSTRACT
Reliability of memory systems is increasingly a concern as memory density increases, the
cell dimension shrinks and new memory technologies move close to commercial use. Meanwhile,
memory power efficiency has become another first-order consideration in memory system design.
Conventional reliability scheme uses ECC (Error Correcting Code) and EDC (Error Detecting
Code) to support error correction and detection in memory systems, putting a rigid constraint
on memory organizations and incurring a significant overhead regarding the power efficiency
and area cost.
This dissertation studies energy-efficient and cost-effective reliability design on both cache
and main memory systems. It first explores the generic approach called embedded ECC in main
memory systems to provide a low-cost and efficient reliability design. A scheme called E3CC
(Enhanced Embedded ECC) is proposed for sub-ranked low-power memories to alleviate the
concern on reliability. In the design, it proposes a novel BCRM (Biased Chinese Remainder
Mapping) to resolve the address mapping issue in page-interleaving scheme. The proposed
BCRM scheme provides an opportunity for building flexible reliability system, which favors
the consumer-level computers to save power consumption.
Within the proposed E3CC scheme, we further explore address mapping schemes at DRAM
device level to provide SEP (Selective Error Protection). A general SEP scheme has been
proposed by others to selectively protect memory regions taking into account of both reliability
and energy efficiency. However, there lacks detailed DRAM address mapping schemes which are
critical to the SEP scheme. We thus explore a group of address mapping schemes at DRAM
device level to map memory requests to their designated regions. All the proposed address
mapping schemes are based on modulo operation. They will be proven, in this thesis, to be
efficient, flexible and promising to various scenarios to favor system requirements.
Additionally, we propose Free ECC reliability design for compressed cache schemes. It
xv
utilizes the unused fragments in compressed cache to store ECC. Such a design not only reduces
the chip overhead but also improves cache utilization and power efficiency. In the design, we
propose an efficient convergent cache allocation scheme to organize the compressed data blocks
more effectively than existing schemes. This new design makes compressed cache an increasingly
viable choice for processors with requirements of high reliability.
Furthermore, we propose a novel, system-level scheme of memory error detection based on
memory integrity check, called MemGuard, to detect memory errors. It uses memory log hashes
to ensure, by strong probability, that memory read log and write log match with each other. It is
much stronger than SECDED (Single-bit Error Correcting and Double-bit Error Detecting) in
error detection and incurs little hardware cost, no storage overhead and little power overhead. It
puts no constraints on memory organization and no major complication to processor design and
operating system design. In consumer-level computers without SECDED protection, it can be
coupled with memory checkpointing to substitute ECC, without the storage and power overhead
associated with ECC. In server computers or other computers requiring strong reliability, it may
complement SECDED or chipkill-correct scheme by providing even stronger error detection. In
the thesis, we prove that the MemGuard reliability design is simple, robust and efficient.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Memory system plays pivotal role in computer systems with either Von Neumann or Harvard
architecture. In these architectures, data and programs are stored in memory system and loaded
into processors for program execution. The reliability of memory system is therefore critically
important to correctness of the execution flow. However, physical threats to memory storage
have been observed decades ago and memory system reliability is increasingly a concern as
the fabrication technology scales down to sub-nanometer regime. Without error protection, a
single upset of memory cell can cause memory and data corruptions, application and system
crashes, system security vulnerabilities [108, 27], and others. The more data memory holds and
the longer it maintains, the higher chance that programs may experience upsets and mishaps.
It has been reported from real machine failure statistics that main memory is responsible for
about 40% of system crashes caused by hardware failure [65].
Another major concern of memory system is performance and power consumption in this
era of multi/many-core per system and multi-thread per core. For years, memory technolo-
gies have been pushing forward to chase the performance of processors. Cache memory is
further optimized to reduce its leakage power and on-chip cache capacity is growing to im-
prove system performance. As for main memory, the mainstream DDRx (Double Data Rate)
DRAM (Dynamic Random-Access Memory) frequency has evolved from 800MHz to 933MHz
and 1066MHz to provide a higher bandwidth. Although supplying voltage of each memory
generation decreases, the power consumption of memory system grows to a serious concern in
computer system design. A typical 2GB to 4GB DDR3 memory can consume 5 to 13 Watt
power varied for different configurations with different workloads [36]. As memory capacity
in a server system is up to 32GB, 64GB and even higher, the power consumption of memory
system is substantially large. Studies on real machines have revealed that DRAM memory
2data ECC
data
ECC
Last-Level Cache
Main Memory
Figure 1.1: Conventional cache and main memory organization with ECC supported. The dark
gray storage is used for ECC.
system can consume more power than processors for memory intensive workloads; and it has
been predicted that future memory systems may consume more than 70% of system power [9].
However, conventional memory error protection scheme introduces significant overhead in
terms of area cost and power consumption. Traditionally, (72, 64) Hamming based [28] or Hsiao
code [31] is applied to provide Single-bit Error Correcting and Double-bit Error Detecting.
Such a code is thus also called SECDED, following its error protection capability. Figure 1.1
shows the memory organization with SECDED ECC (Error Correcting Code) supported. In
both cache and main memory system, extra 1/8 storage is appended to original data arrays
to maintain ECC, which is shown in dark gray fields in the figure. As the applied SECDED
code strictly presents 8:1 ratio for data and ECC code word for a typical 64-byte data block, it
limits the rigid organization of memory system. For example, an eight (x8) DIMM (Dual-Inline
Memory Module) requires one extra DRAM device for ECC and a sixteen (x4) DIMM requires
two more devices. However, it is challenging for a memory module or mobile memory system
with one, two or four devices to preserve the 8:1 ratio. Such a rigid organization of conventional
ECC design limits the adoption of new memory techniques, presenting challenges on designing
a reliable and power-efficient system.
This dissertation studies energy-efficient and cost-effective reliability design on both cache
and main memory systems. It first proposes E3CC (Enhanced Embedded ECC) for power effi-
3cient sub-ranked and other narrow-ranked memory organizations. By embedding ECC together
with data storage, E3CC design decouples the connection between number of DRAM devices
and error protection code. E3CC design presents the opportunity of flexibility in reliability de-
sign and makes sub-ranked memory organization a viable choice for systems with requirements
of power efficiency and high reliability. Secondly, it further explores E3CC scheme to imple-
ment SEP (Selective Error Protection). SEP framework design is proposed by others [68] for
energy efficient reliability design consideration as it protects solely the critical data. However,
there lacks DRAM device level address mapping schemes to support SEP. We thus explore a
group of address mapping schemes based on efficient modulo operation. The proposed mapping
schemes are flexible, efficient and promising to various scenarios to favor the system require-
ments. Thirdly, it proposes Free ECC design for compressed LLC (Last Level Cache), relying on
the observation that substantial idle fragments are left unused in compressed caches. Free ECC
design maintains ECC in those fragments to save the dedicated storage required in conventional
ECC design to further improve cache capacity utilization and power efficiency. Additionally,
it proposes MemGuard, a system-level scheme with lightweight hardware extension to support
or enhance memory reliability for a wide spectrum of computer systems including consumer
computers with or without ECC and large-scale, high-performance computing applications.
The design is simple, efficient and strong in error detection capability.
In detail, Chapter 3 develops E3CC. It explores the generic approach of embedded ECC on
power-efficient sub-ranked and other narrow-ranked memory systems. It embeds ECC together
with data to avoid using the extra DRAM devices to maintain ECC, which are required in
conventional ECC DIMM. In the design, it proposes a novel BCRM (Biased Chinese Remainder
Mapping) to resolve the DRAM device-level address mapping challenge since effective memory
capacity is reduced to a non-power-of-two size as ECC is embedded. It also identifies the issue of
extra ECC traffic in DDR3 memories embedded ECC may cause, as a result of the burst length
requirement of DDR3. A simple and effective cache scheme called ECC-cache is proposed to
effectively reduce this traffic overhead. The E3CC design enables ECC on conventional non-
ECC DIMMs, which presents the opportunity of flexibility in reliability design. The design is
demonstrated to be efficient and reliable.
4Chapter 4 explores DRAM device-level address mappings for SEP (Selective Error Protec-
tion). SEP requires to partition memory space into a protected region and an unprotected
region. In this case, a unique and effective address mapping scheme is needed to avoid the
use of complex Euclidean division. It therefore explores the CRM (Chinese Remainder Map-
ping) scheme, and by grouping multiple-columns/rows as a super-column/row, it proves that
CRM is effective for most cases to maintain either access parallelism or row buffer locality.
For a corner case that CRM-based mapping is challenging to present row buffer locality, it
proposes a section-based address mapping scheme, in which the address space is divided into
sections based on greatest common divisor. Additionally, it proposes adjustment-factors for
the proposed mapping schemes to further tune the mapping layout in order to obtain required
properties. The proposed schemes are all modulo based and they are flexible, efficient and
promising to various scenarios that require memory partitioning.
Chapter 5 proposes Free ECC design to embed ECC into substantial idle fragments left,
otherwise unused, in compressed LLC (Last Level Cache). It thus saves the dedicated storage
for ECC in conventional reliable cache design and the power consumption. In the design, it first
proposes a convergent allocation scheme to organize compressed data blocks in cache efficiently,
targeting high compression ratio and low design complexity. Based on the proposed layout, it
carefully examines the technical issues and design challenges in embedding ECC. Three cases
are distinguished and discussed in detail and Free ECC design is demonstrated to be simple
and efficient.
Chapter 6 presents MemGuard, a system-level error protection scheme to provide or enhance
memory reliability for a wide spectrum of computer systems. The core part of MemGuard is
a hash-checking based low-cost and highly-effective mechanism of memory error detection. In
detail, a read log hash (ReadHash) and a write log hash(WriteHash) are maintained, 128-
bit each for data correction check. The two hashes conceptually are hashed values of the
log of all read and write accesses from or to main memory. By synchronizing to the same
point of the two hashes periodically or at the end of program execution, the two match each
other. Otherwise, errors are detected. The proposed MemGuard design can detect multi-bit
errors of main memory, in very strong confidence. This reliability design is generic, which can
5be applied to both consumer level devices with or without error protection and large-scale,
high-performance computing applications to enhance their reliability.
The overall organization of the rest of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 introduces
background of main memory organization, memory error causes and consequences, and con-
ventional memory error protection schemes. Chapter 3 develops the E3CC design to support
error protection for sub-ranked and other narrow-ranked main memories. Chapter 4 explores
a group of mapping schemes at DRAM device level to support selective error protection for
energy efficient concern. Chapter 5 proposes the Free ECC organization to reduce the cost
of error protection for compressed cache schemes. Chapter 6 presents a system-level memory
error protection with lightweight hardware extension, to support or enhance memory reliability
for a wide spectrum of computer systems. Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation and outlines
future research directions.
6CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
This chapter introduces the background of main memory organizations, basic operation
commands and its power model, which is applied in this thesis for memory power evaluations.
The detailed causes and consequences of memory errors are presented to identify the issue and
conventional memory error protection schemes are introduced. Their rigid organizations and
significant overheads motivate our study.
2.1 Main Memory Organization
Conventional main memory in desktop computers and servers may consist of multiple chan-
nels and each channel connects to one to four DIMMs (Dual Inline Memory Module). A DIMM
is a PCB (Print Circuit Board) that contains one or two ranks, which is formed by eight (x8 or
sixteen x4) DRAM devices. A rank of DRAM devices are operated in tandem to form a 64-bit
data path, which is connected to memory controller through a 64-bit data bus. A memory
request is served by eight bursts on the data bus to pump a 64-byte data block, which is the
same size to the last-level cache data block. In detail, each DRAM device typically consists of
eight DRAM banks and the requested data block is fetched from DRAM bank to row buffer
and then to memory controller for a read request. For a memory write request, the data flow
direction is reversed. Figure 2.1 presents an example modern DDRx DRAM memory organi-
zation, where memory controller issues memory commands and memory request addresses to
DRAM devices and data is transferred in between the two through the data bus.
There are up to three commands in DDRx memory system for serving a request, namely
row activation, column access and precharge [87, 13]. The activation command is issued to the
entire rank of banks to drive data from DRAM device cells to a bank sense amplifier, also called
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Figure 2.1: A conventional DDRx memory organization without error protection.
row buffer as one of its main functions is to temporarily retain data. A DRAM row is also called
opened once it is activated. With a row opened, the following column access command can
fetch a 64-byte data block directly from the row buffer. Typically, the row buffer is large, 8KB
for example, so that continuous column access commands can be issued targeting the opened
row. Such a case is called row buffer hit as it saves an extra row activation command to open
the row for the column access. When a memory request is completed, a precharge command
can be issued to restore data from row buffer back to DRAM device cells and the bank is said
to be closed. As all rows in one bank share the same row buffer, solely one row can be opened
in each bank. With the bank precharged, a DRAM access cycle is said to be completed and
the bank is ready for another activation command.
2.2 DDRx DRAM Power Model
DDRx DRAM power is classified into four categories: background, operation, read/write,
and I/O [70]. Operation power is consumed when bank precharge and activation commands
are executed. Read/write power is for memory read and write while I/O power is to drive data
bus for a rank and to terminate data on other ranks in the channel. DDRx DRAM supports
multiple power levels to reduce background power as it is consumed consistently with or without
operations. Figure 2.2 presents the three power levels and six power modes that a DRAM device
can stay. The three levels are standby, powerdown and self-refresh. A DRAM rank is said to
be in precharge standby if all the banks in the rank are closed; otherwise, it is active standby.
The two standby modes consume high background power but the rank is ready for accesses.
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Figure 2.2: DDRx memory background power states tensions. PDE: PowerDown Enter; PDX:
PowerDown eXit; SRE: Self-Refresh Enter; SRX: Self-Refresh eXit.
When the clock is disabled, the two standby modes transit to their corresponding powerdown
modes, namely precharge powerdown fast and active powerdown. These two powerdown modes
consume less power than standby modes with penalty of longer access latency to wake up the
rank. There is one extra mode for precharge powerdown, namely, precharge powerdown slow.
It is entered with DLL (Delay Lock Loop) frozen and it consumes less power than precharge
powerdown fast but takes longer time to be ready for memory requests. The last power level
is called self-refresh that consumes the least power as it just performs the periodic refresh
operations to retain the data. It takes the longest time to wake up for memory accesses.
2.3 Memory Error Causes and Consequences
2.3.1 Causes of Memory Errors
Memory soft error was first reported by May and Woods [67] in 1979. Since then consider-
able efforts have been spent on memory error studies [45, 72, 10, 6, 113, 114, 103, 73]. Memory
errors are mainly caused by unexpected charge intrusions due to particle injections. For years,
multiple mechanisms have been observed to induce memory errors [6, 39, 40]. Alpha particles
emitted by impurities in packaging materials are proved to be the dominant cause of soft er-
rors decades ago. Then high-energy and low-energy neutrons from cosmic rays are observed to
tamper memory data through two different mechanisms. As memory technology scales down
to nanometer regime, complex physical effects are increasingly challenging to memory reliabil-
9ity [39, 40]. In detail, ITRS 2011 presents the following effects. First, the thinner MOS gate
dielectric sustains less time to breakdown. Second, the scaling effect raises the issues of process
variations and random charge fluctuations, which exacerbate memory cell reliability. There are
also many other effects, such as p-channel negative bias temperature instability (NBTI), the
random telegraph noise (RTN) and others [39] that are increasingly severe.
2.3.2 Memory Error Rate and Consequences
Recent studies on large field real machines have found that main memory error rate is orders
of magnitude higher than previously reported. One of the most recent studies on Google’s fleet
of servers reports about 25,000∼70,000 FIT per Mbit of DRAM systems [92]; FIT represents
failures in a billion operation hours. The ratio of correctable error is 8.2% per year among ECC
DIMMs, i.e. 8.2 of every 100 DIMMs detect and correct at least one error. The probability of
uncorrectable error is 0.28% per year among ECC DIMMs, and 0.08% per year with Chipkill
correct. Another study based on IBM Blue Gene (BG) supercomputers at multiple national
laboratories also reports high error rate [33]; for example, FIT of 97,614 on BG/L computers at
the Lawrence Livemore National Laboratory and 167,066 on BG/P computers at the Argonne
National Laboratory. In addition, it observes error correlation on the same row or column,
indicating high rate for multi-bit errors. Some other studies [59, 10] also show the increase of
memory error rate. ITRS 2011 [39] proposes the requirement of 1,000 FIT for future DRAM
error ratio, which is challenging to meet.
Cache memory reliability has also been a serious concern for decades. It is increasingly
severe for several reasons as manufacture technology scales down. First, data stored in shrunk
cells becomes more vulnerable to energetic particles, such as alpha particles and neutrons.
Even if single cell memory error rate keeps constant, number of errors in entire cache grows
with the increase of cache capacity [6]. The cache memory error rate is further exacerbated
as operating voltage decreases and processor operating frequency increases. Meanwhile, the
aggressive optimization for reducing leakage power worsens cache error rate [14]. On-chip
cache usually occupies a large portion of chip area, which presents a high probability of upset.
In addition, the errors in cache can propagate easily, corrupting applications and even crashing
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the system as cache is close to the processing units and register files [118].
Memory errors may have unpredictable and sometimes serious consequences to computer
users. It may lead to user data errors, program or system crashes, and in the worst case security
vulnerabilities [108, 27]. It has been reported that, among all computer components, memory
error is the top cause of system crashes [91]. As for security, a memory error may cause illegal
and unpredictable control flow. A study [27] on Java program execution shows that a single-bit
error has a chance as high as 70% to induce the execution of arbitrary code.
2.4 Memory Error Protection
A large amount of studies have focused on main memory error protections [45, 72, 10, 6,
113, 114, 103, 73]. The most widely adopt scheme is to use ECC (Error Correcting Code),
such as SECDED [83, 24], i.e. Single-bit Error Correcting and Double-bit Error Detecting.
Specifically, it employs a (72, 64) Hamming [28] based or Hsiao Code [31], which encodes a
64-bit data into a 72-bit ECC word with 8 parity bits. A single-bit error within the 72-bit
ECC word is correctable and a double-bit error is detectable but not correctable. Another
simple code is EDC (Error Detecting Code), which requires merely one even/odd parity bit for
a 64-bit data block. It can be used to detect all odd-bit errors.
In DDRx memory systems, a non-ECC DDRx DIMM usually has one or two ranks of DRAM
devices, with eight x8 or sixteen x4 devices (chips) in each rank to form a 64-bit data path.
A conventional ECC DIMM, with SECDED, has nine x8 or eighteen x4 devices per rank to
form a 72-bit data path, with the extra one or two devices to store the parity bits. The DDRx
data buses are 64-bit and 72-bit, respectively, without and with ECC. Therefore ECC DIMMs
are not compatible with a motherboard designed for non-ECC DIMMs. In addition, the 8:1
ratio of SECDED code presents a rigid organization of DIMM structures. With DDRx memory
modules of four devices in a rank, the ECC overhead is higher to maintain the 8:1 ratio. Cache
memories also adopt SECDED protection in general. For a 64-byte cache block, it attaches 8
bytes ECC codeword, which incurs 12.5% storage and power overhead. As cache organization is
more flexible than DDRx memory system, there are many other types of codes for higher error
protection, such as DECTED (Double-bit Error Correcting and Triple-bit Error Detection),
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SNCDND (Single-Nibble error Correction and Double-Nibble error Detection) [11] and Reed
Solomon [84] codes. However, they are rarely used due to high overheads. For example, the
overheads are 23% and 22% for DECTED and SNCDND, respectively, given a 64-byte data
word.
Chipkill Correct [64, 35, 15], a stronger but more costly design, has the capability of Single
Device Data Correction (SDDC) in addition to SECDED in DRAM systems. Previous Chipkill
design uses eight DRAM devices to tolerate single-device error in 64 devices following SECDED
coding structure. It introduces significant power overhead as 72 devices are grouped to work
in lockstep. A recent design groups multiple bits from one memory device as a symbol and
applies symbol-correction code to recover a device failure [113, 114]. It typically organizes 36
x4 DRAM devices in a particular way to form a 144-bit data path, transferring both data and
symbol-correction code. Such a scheme involves 36 DRAM devices in one memory access, still
with significant memory power consumption. The most recent Chipkill design [103] proposes
multi-tier error detection and correction schemes to form a Chipkill level protection. It uses
nine x8 DRAM devices to carefully organize data, EDC and ECC bits at each tier, but with
an increased ratio of storage overhead. The downside of chipkill, however, is excessive memory
power consumption because in most Chipkill schemes each memory access may involve many
more memory devices than conventional ECC memories.
All these reliability designs on DRAM systems limit error protection in DRAM itself and
the designs are tightly coupled with DRAM device types and organizations. The schemes are
inefficient in terms of storage, cost and power consumption.
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CHAPTER 3. E3CC: RELIABILITY SCHEME FOR
NARROW-RANKED LOW-POWER MEMORIES
This chapter presents and evaluates E3CC (Enhanced Embedded ECC), a full design and
implementation of a generic embedded ECC scheme that enables power-efficient error protection
for subranked memory systems. It incorporates a novel address mapping scheme called BCRM
(Biased Chinese Remainder Mapping) to resolve the address mapping issue for memories of
page interleaving, plus a simple and effective cache design to reduce extra ECC traffic. Our
evaluation using SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks confirms the performance and power efficiency
of the E3CC scheme for subranked memories as well as conventional memories.
3.1 Introduction
Memory reliability is increasingly a concern with the rapid improvement of memory density
and capacity, as memory holds more and more data. Without error protection, a single upset of
memory cell may lead to memory corruption, which may have further consequences including
permanent data corruption, program and system crashes, security vulnerabilities, and others.
However, the majority of consumer-level computers and devices have not yet adopted any
memory error protection scheme. The more data in unprotected memory and the longer they
stay there, the higher chance that users may experience those mishaps.
Meanwhile, memory power efficiency has become a first-order consideration in computer
design. DRAM memory systems can consume more power than processors [60] on memory
intensive workloads; and it has been predicted that future systems may spend more than 70%
of power in memory [9]. Recently proposed sub-ranked DDRx memories [2, 1, 121, 105] reduce
memory power consumption significantly by using memory sub-ranks of less than 64-bit data
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bus and less number of devices than conventional DDRx memories; for example, with two x8
devices in a sub-rank of 16-bit bus width. Additionally, mobile devices such as iOS, Android,
and Windows phones and tablets have started to use low-power DDRx (LPDDR, LPDDR2,
LPDDR3 and the incoming LPDDR4) memory with 32-bit data bus, which is similar to 32-bit
sub-ranked memory. Those mobile devices have been increasingly used in applications that re-
quire reliable computing to an extent; for example, medical care, mobile banking, construction,
and others.
The two trends lead to a conflict between memory reliability and power efficiency. Con-
ventional ECC memory employs a memory error protection scheme using a (72, 64) SECDED
code, of which an ECC word consists of 64 data bits and eight ECC bits. A memory rank in
ECC DDRx memory may consist of eight x8 memory devices (chips) dedicated for data and
one x8 device dedicated for ECC, or sixteen x4 devices dedicated for data and two x4 devices
dedicated for ECC. Sub-ranked and those narrow-ranked low-power memories are incompatible
with this memory rank organization, leaving the question how to implement error protection in
them1. The study of Mini-Rank [121], one type of sub-ranked memory organization, proposes a
generic approach called Embedded ECC to alleviate the concern. In Embedded ECC, data bits
and ECC bits of an ECC word are mixed together, and therefore dedicated ECC devices are no
longer needed. It essentially decouples memory organization and the choice of error protection
code. With the mixing, however, the effective size of DRAM row is no longer power-of-two,
which complicates memory device-level address mapping. If an efficient address mapping is
non-existent, Embedded ECC will not be a practical solution. Embedded ECC does identify
CRM (Chinese Reminder Mapping) [25] to be a potential solution to the address mapping
issue, but there lacks design and implementation details.
This chapter presents E3CC (Enhanced Embedded ECC), which is a full design and imple-
mentation of Embedded ECC, but with its own innovations and contributions. E3CC shares
the following merits with the original Embedded ECC (most of which were not identified in
the previous study [121]):
• E3CC can be integrated into sub-ranked memory, yielding a power-efficient and reliable
1If a shorter ECC word is used, ECC storage overhead will increase significantly.
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memory system. It can also be applied to those mobile devices using low-power DDRx
memory.
• Although it is proposed for sub-ranked memories, it may also be used to provide ECC
protection to non-ECC DDRx DIMMs by an extension to memory controller, with no
change to the DIMMs or devices. Such a system can be booted in either ECC memory
mode or non-ECC memory mode.
• It is now possible to use other error protection codes with more extension in memory
controller; for example, a long BCH(532, 512) code that corrects 2-bit error and detects 3-
bit error using 532-bit word size and with 3.9% overhead. By comparison, the conventional
ECC memory corrects 1-bit error and detects 2-bit error using 72-bit word size and with
12.5% overhead.
This study on E3CC has its own contributions and innovations beyond the original idea of
Embedded ECC:
• The E3CC is a thorough design and a complete solution. Equally important, its per-
formance and power efficiency have been thoroughly evaluated by detailed simulation of
realistic memory settings. Both are critical to prove that E3CC will be a working idea
when applied. By comparison, the original Embedded ECC was a generic idea, with
little design detail and no evaluation at all. It was a supplemental idea to the Mini-Rank
design.
• A novel and unique address mapping scheme called Biased Chinese Reminder Mapping
(BCRM) has been proposed to resolve the address mapping issue for page-interleaving
address mapping scheme. BCRM is an innovation by itself. It can be used in memory
systems where the address mapping is not power-of-two based and spatial locality is
desired.
• The study of Mini-Rank [121] identified CRM [25] as a potential method of efficient
address mapping, which motivated the search for BCRM. However, this study has found
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out that cacheline-interleaving in Embedded ECC does not really need CRM; and for
page-interleaving, CRM may destroy or degrade the row-level locality of page-interleaving.
• This study identifies the issue of extra ECC traffic in DDR3 memories that Embedded
ECC may cause, as a result of the burst length requirement of DDR3. A simple and
effective scheme called ECC-cache is proposed to effectively reduce this traffic overhead.
E3CC and the original Embedded ECC idea are related to but different from recent studies
on memory ECC design. In particular, Virtualized ECC [113, 114] also makes ECC flexible as
E3CC does, but by storing ECC bits into separate memory pages. It relies on a processor’s
cache to buffer unused ECC bits to avoid extra ECC traffic. E3CC has more predictable
worst-case performance than Virtualized ECC, because it puts data bits and the associated
ECC bits in the same DRAM rows. Accessing uncached ECC bits is merely an extra column
access and additional memory bursts following those for data, with only a few nanoseconds
added to memory latency, and no extra power spent on DRAM precharge and row activation.
LOT-ECC [103] provides chipkill-level reliability using nine-device rank (assuming x8 devices).
LOT-ECC also stores ECC bits with data bits in the same DRAM rows; however, it is otherwise
very different from E3CC in design. LOT-ECC provides stronger reliability than E3CC but
at the cost of more storage overhead (26.5% vs. 14.1%). The LOT-ECC design as presented
is not compatible with sub-ranked memories, and thus LOT-ECC memory may not be as
power-efficient as E3CC memory with sub-ranking.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces background of sub-
ranked memory organizations and related work. Section 3.3 presents novel address mapping
and the design of Embedded ECC. Section 3.4 describes the performance and power simulation
platform for DDRx memory. The performance and power simulation results are presented and
analyzed in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Background and Related Work
Sub-ranked Memory Organization A memory access may involve up to three DRAM
operations, namely precharge, activation (row access), and read/write (column access). The
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of the conventional registered non-ECC DIMM and a sub-ranked non-
ECC DIMM organization. The sub-ranked DIMM consists of four devices per rank in this
example.
memory controller issues commands to all devices in a rank to perform those operations. Sub-
ranked memory organization [121, 2, 1, 105] is proposed to reduce the number of devices in a
rank so as to reduce DRAM operation power spent on precharge and activation. It also increases
the number of sub-ranks, which helps reduce DRAM background power. Figure 3.1 illustrates
two DIMM organizations, a conventional registered DIMM and sub-ranked DIMM with 32-bit
rank size. The difference is that the incoming commands and addresses are buffered and de-
multiplexed to the devices in the destination sub-rank. This difference makes them sub-ranked,
i.e. a full-size rank is now divided into sub-ranks of four, two or even one device. Figure 3.1b
shows an example of sub-ranked DIMM with four devices per rank. For each memory access,
the number of DRAM devices involved is effectively reduced, thus effectively reducing the row
activation power and background power, which dominate memory power consumption.
Related Work There have been many studies on memory system reliability [113, 114,
90, 94, 103, 73, 115] and memory power efficiency [16, 32, 121, 104]. Most of those reliability-
related studies focus on error correction for phase change memory and cache memory. Two
studies closely related to our work are Virtualized ECC [113, 114] and LOT-ECC [103], which
have been discussed in Section 3.1.
Recent studies show another trend of adopting sub-ranked memory architecture for power
concern. The sub-ranked memory architecture divides conventional memory rank into multiple
sub-ranks, each with a smaller number of DRAM devices involved. Mini-rank DIMM [121]
breaks conventional DRAM rank into multiple smaller mini-ranks to reduce the number of
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Figure 3.2: An example layout of a memory block of cacheline size (512-bit) inside a rank of
a conventional ECC DDR3 DIMM using x8 devices. Each rank has eight data devices plus an
ECC device. Each device has multiple banks, which is not shown. D represents a generic data
super-column, and E represents a generic ECC super-column. One super-column is 64-bit, or
eight columns in a device row. Bi represents a 64-bit sub-block of the memory block, and Ei
represents the corresponding eight ECC bits. The memory block occupies eight 64-bit super-
columns that are distributed over the eight devices; the ECC bits are stored in a column in
the ECC device. An 8K-bit row consists of 128 super-columns. The row layouts of the second
device and the ECC device are selectively highlighted, and so are the mappings of sub-block
B1 and the ECC bits.
DRAM devices involved in one memory access, which thereby reduces the activation and row
access power. The introduced bridge-chip works as a transfer to send 64-bit data to the 64-bit
data bus. Multi-core DIMM [2, 1] is similar to sub-rank but uses split data bus with shared
command and address bus to reduce the design complexity.
3.3 Design of E3CC
In this section, we present the design of E3CC and discuss in detail its design issues including
memory block layout, page-interleaving and BCRM, ECC traffic overhead and ECC-cache, and
the use of long error protecting code. All discussions are specific to DDR2/DDR3 DRAM
memory; however, most discussions are also valid to other types of memory such as phase-
change memories.
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Figure 3.3: An example layout of a memory block of cacheline size (512-bit) inside a rank of
E3CC DDR3 DIMM of the full rank size. Other assumptions are the same as in Figure 3.2.
The row layout of the second device is selectively highlighted, and so are the mappings of the
second sub-block B1 and the ECC sub-block E1.
3.3.1 DIMM Organization and Intra-Block Layout
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 contrast the difference of conventional ECC memory and E3CC memory.
They show the mapping of memory sub-blocks inside a memory block of cacheline size; note
that a memory block may be mapped to multiple memory devices. Most memory accesses are
caused by cache miss, writeback, or prefetch. The examples assume Micron DDR3-1600 x8
device MT41J256M8 [69], which is 2G-bit each and has 8 internal banks, 32K rows per rank,
1K columns per row and eight bits per column. DDR3 requires a minimum burst length of
eight, so each column access involves consecutive eight columns. We call an aligned group
of eight columns a super-column. The ECC is a (72, 64) SECDED code made by a (71, 64)
Hamming code plus a checksum bit, so each ECC word consists of 64 data bits and 8 ECC bits.
In the conventional ECC DIMM, a memory block of the 64B cacheline size may occupy eight
64-bit super-columns distributed over the eight data devices. The ECC bits occupy a single
super-column in the ECC device.
E3CC DIMM is physically the same as conventional non-ECC DIMM. However, the ECC
bits are mixed with data bits in the same DRAM rows. To maintain the 8:1 ratio of data and
ECC, there is one ECC super-column for every eight data super-columns. The data bits of the
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Figure 3.4: An example layout of a memory block of cacheline size (512-bit) for 16-bit sub-
ranked E3CC DDR3 DIMM. The other assumptions and notations are the same as in Figures 3.2
and 3.3. The row layout of the third device is selectively highlighted, and so are the mappings
of sub-blocks B0-B3 and the ECC sub-blocks E0-E3.
memory block are distributed over the eight devices, one super-column per device. The ECC
bits are also evenly distributed, occupying 1/8 super-column per device. An ECC super-column
in the row is made by ECC bits from eight memory blocks. For this particular device, each
row has 112 data super-columns and 14 ECC super-columns. The last two super-columns are
not utilized, which are 1.6% storage overhead, in addition to the 12.5% ECC storage overhead.
The layouts can have different variants as long as the data and ECC bits of a memory
block are evenly distributed over all devices in the rank and using the same row address. The
intra-block layout of E3CC DIMM is designed to be compatible with the burst length of eight
of DDR3 devices2. A DDR3 device uses an internal buffer of eight bits per I/O pin to convert
slow and parallel data into high-speed serial data; therefore, for a x8 device, each column access
(data read/write) involves 64-bit memory data. Accessing a memory block of 64B requires only
a single column access. However, accessing the associated ECC bits requires another column
access (but no extra precharge or activation), of which only 1/8th of the bits are needed. We
proposed ECC-cache to address this issue, which will be discussed in Section 3.3.4. DDR2 also
2DDR3 has a burst chop 4 mode, in which the burst length is reduced to four but with extra performance
overhead introduced.
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supports a burst length of four (in addition to eight), for which the layout can be different.
Figure 3.4 shows the intra-block layout for 16-bit sub-ranked E3CC DIMM. The DIMM
organization is the same as 16-bit sub-ranked, non-ECC DIMM. The memory block is now
mapped to two x8 devices, using four data super-columns and 1/2 ECC super-column. Each
memory access involves two devices, drastically reducing the power and energy spent on device
precharge and activation. Accessing the ECC bits incurs less potential waste of bandwidth
than before, as two memory blocks share one ECC super-column instead of eight in fully
ranked DIMM. The last two super-columns are still leftover.
We do not show the layouts of 8-bit and 32-bit sub-ranked organizations as they are sim-
ilar to that of the 16-bit, except that the memory block is mapped to one and four devices,
respectively. The leftover ratio stays at 1.6% as the last two columns cannot be utilized. For
8-bit sub-ranked DIMM, the ECC bits of a memory block occupy a whole ECC super-column
and therefore there is no potential waste of bandwidth when accessing the ECC bits.
3.3.2 Interleaving Schemes and Address Mapping
Memory interleaving decides how a memory block is mapped to memory channel, DIMM,
rank and bank. It is part of the memory address mapping, i.e. to translate a given physical
memory block address to the channel, DIMM, rank, bank, row and column indexes/addresses.
In conventional ECC DIMM, the logic design is simply a matter of splitting memory address
bits. With E3CC, the number of memory blocks in the same row of the same rank and bank is
no longer power-of-two, which complicates the memory device-level address mapping.
Two commonly used address mapping schemes are cacheline-interleaving and page-interleaving,
and each has its variants. Figure 3.5 shows representative address mappings of the two types in
DDRx memories. The main difference is that in page-interleaving, consecutive memory blocks
(within page boundary) are mapped to the same DRAM rows, where in cacheline-interleaving
the consecutive blocks are distributed evenly over channels, DIMMs, ranks and banks (not
necessarily in that order). Page-interleaving is commonly used with open page policy, in which
the row buffer of a bank is kept open after access; and cacheline-interleaving is commonly used
with close-page policy. If another access falls into the same memory row, the data is still in the
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Row Bank Rank DIMM Channel
Column Row Bank Rank DIMM Channel Block Offset
Column Block Offset
Cacheline interleaving 1
Page interleaving
Column Row BankRank DIMM Channel Block Offset
Cacheline interleaving 2
Figure 3.5: Representative memory address mappings for cacheline-interleaving and page-
interleaving in DDRx memory systems. Cacheline interleaving 1 may be used in systems of
memory power and thermal concerns, and cacheline interleaving 2 may be used to minimize
the impact of rank-to-rank switching penalty on memory throughput.
row buffer of the bank and thus the read/write operation may start immediately. Otherwise,
the bank must be precharged and then activated before the read/write operation, increasing
memory access latency. Cacheline-interleaving with close-page policy is generally more power-
efficient than page-interleaving with open-page policy, because it consumes more power to keep
a row buffer open. However, the latter can be more power-efficient if there is a high level of
page locality in memory accesses.
A major concern of E3CC is regarding the address mapping scheme, because the effective
size of DRAM rows, e.g. the number of data blocks/bits (excluding ECC bits) they hold, is
no longer power-of-two. That means the column address may not be extracted directly from the
physical memory address bits; and all address components to the left of the column address
bits will be affected. We find that, however, for column-interleaving schemes whose column
address is the leftmost bits in the physical memory address, the address mapping is not an
issue. Those address components can be broken down as shown in Figure 3.5; the difference
is that a subset of high-end column addresses becomes invalid, as they would represent invalid
physical memory addresses on E3CC memory. Page-interleaving, however, is affected because
the column address appears in middle of the physical memory address. An integer division
may have to be used, unless a unique and efficient address mapping scheme is found.
However, using integer division may negatively affect memory latency and throughput. It
was not acceptable in 1980s and 1990s [54, 101, 25], and still very questionable in modern
processors. A 32-bit integer division takes many clock cycles (56∼70 in Pentium 4 processor).
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Super-Block Address
Global row address
Row Bank Rank DIMM Channel
Page-interleaving
BCR Mapping Logic
Memory Block Address
Offset
Column Addr. Logic
Column Addr. 
Sequence
u
v
d
Figure 3.6: The logic flow of BCRM-based address mapping with page-interleaving.
It can be even more expensive than double-precision floating-point division (38 in Pentium 4
processor) [100]. A recent manual from Intel [37] reports that the latency of IDIV (Integer
Division) instruction is from 20 to 70 cycles for Intel 64 and IA-32 architectures. We did
simulation to evaluate the performance impact of adding 5ns, 10ns and 15ns for integer division
delay to the memory controller overhead, using the baseline simulation setting in Section 3.4.
The performance degradation is 3%, 5% and 7%, respectively. The simulation assumes that the
division unit is fully pipelined. In reality, it is difficult to pipeline a division unit; that means
multiple division units may have to be used, or this will be another factor limiting memory
throughput. In our simulation setting, the peak memory throughput is one access per 2.5ns.
Finally, for mobile processors or SoCs (System-On-Chip) of relatively low speed, the latency of
integer division may be even longer than 15ns.
3.3.3 Page-Interleaving with BCRM
CRM and BCRM We have found a novel and efficient address mapping scheme called
BCRM (Biased Chinese Reminder Mapping). We start with an existing scheme called CRM
(Chinese Reminder Mapping), which was proposed based on Chinese Reminder Theorem [25],
in which a memory block address d is decomposed into a pair of integers 〈u, v〉, with 0 ≤ d ≤
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 8 16 24 32 40 48
1 49 1 9 17 25 33 41
2 42 50 2 10 18 26 34
3 35 43 51 3 11 19 27
4 28 36 44 52 4 12 20
5 21 29 37 45 53 5 13
6 14 22 30 38 46 54 6
7 7 15 23 31 39 47 55
Table 3.1: An example of layout for the address mapping from d to 〈u, v〉 based on the CRM,
with m = 8 and p = 7. For example, 11 is mapped to 〈3, 4〉 as 11 mod 8 = 3 and 11 mod 7 = 4.
A row represents a value of u and a column represents a value of v. The numbers in bold type
highlight the mapping for the first 14 blocks. In CRM, each column is intended to represent a
memory bank, and consecutive blocks should be mapped evenly to multiple banks. Row-level
locality does not matter.
pm− 1, 0 ≤ u ≤ m− 1 and 0 ≤ v ≤ p− 1, using the following formula3:
u = d mod m, v = d mod p
CRM ensures that the mapping from d to 〈u, v〉 is “perfect” if p and m are coprimes, where
being “perfect” means all possible combinations of (u, v) are used in the address mapping. Two
integers are coprimes if their greatest common divisor is 1. The formal proof of the “perfect”
property is given in the previous study [25]. Table 3.1 shows the layout of block address d under
this mapping, assuming p = 7 and m = 8. As it shows, the numbers are laid out diagonally
in the two-dimension table. In a prime memory system, p is intended to be the number of
memory banks and m the number of memory blocks in a bank, and p is also intended to be
a prime number. However, when used with page-interleaving, CRM will disturb the row-level
locality as it was not designed for maintaining the locality.
BCRM adds a bias factor to the original CRM formula:
u = ((d− (d mod p)) mod m, v = d mod p
The bias factor −(d mod p) adjusts the row position of each block; it “draws back” consecutive
blocks to the same row. Table 3.2 shows an example of BCRM using the same parameters as
3We have reversed the notations of u and v from the equations in [25].
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 49 50 51 52 53 54 55
2 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
3 35 36 37 38 39 40 41
4 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
5 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
6 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
7 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Table 3.2: An example of layout for BCRM, which maps d to 〈u, v〉 with m = 8 and p = 7.
For example, 11 is mapped to 〈7, 4〉 as (11 − (11 mod 7)) mod 8 = 7 and 11 mod 7 = 4. A
row represents a value of u and a column represents a value of v. The numbers in bold type
highlight the mapping for the first 14 blocks. In BCRM, each row is intended to represent a
memory row (all blocks in the same row resides in a single bank, and different rows may or
may not be mapped to the same bank), so maintaining row-level locality or not makes a critical
difference.
in Table 3.1. In our application scenario, u is the global row address and v is super-block index
(to be discussed) in the row. The global row address is further decomposed as channel, DIMM,
rank, bank, and row addresses as Figure 3.6 shows.
Proof of Correctness and Row Locality BCRM is a “perfect” address mapping,
i.e. the mapping is mathematically a one-to-one function from d ∈ [0,mp − 1] to 〈u, v〉 ∈
[〈0, 0〉, 〈m − 1, p − 1〉]. This can be proven as follows. CRM has been proven to be a perfect
address mapping [25], i.e. it can be formulated as a one-to-one mathematical function cr from
[0,mp− 1] to [〈0, 0〉, 〈m− 1, p− 1〉]. BCRM can be formulated as a mathematical function bcr
defined as following:
bcr(d) = f(cr(d))
f(〈u, v〉) = 〈(u− v) mod m, v〉
Function f is obviously a one-to-one function from [〈0, 0〉, 〈m−1, p−1〉] to [〈0, 0〉, 〈m−1, p−1〉].
Therefore, bcr is a one-to-one function from [0,mp− 1] to [〈0, 0〉, 〈m− 1, p− 1〉].
BCRM has the property of “row locality”: assume x is an integer that satisfies (x mod p) =
0, then x, x+ 1, . . . , x+ p− 1 will be mapped to the same row, i.e. the value of u is the same
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for those consecutive d values.
Using BCRM in Memory Address Mapping We let u be the global row address and
m be the number of all DRAM rows in the whole system, which is a power of two. We make
v be the index of memory super-block, which is so defined such that each row hosts exactly
7 memory super-blocks. Correspondingly, d is the global memory super-block address. The
scheme is feasible because in E3CC the number of utilized columns in a row is a multiple of 7,
as 63 columns are utilized for every 64 columns. For example, for the example in Figure 3.3
a memory super-block is 112/7 = 16 blocks, and for the example in Figure 3.4 a super-block
is 28/7 = 4 blocks. We assume that each row has 64 or a multiple of 64 super-columns, which
is valid for today’s memory device. As device capacity continues to increase, it will continue
to hold. After v is generated, the memory controller generates a sequence of column addresses
from v (plus the removed bits) for the corresponding data and ECC columns.
A merit of those non-power-of-two mappings using modulo operations is that fast and
efficient logic design exists for modulo operation (d mod p), particularly if p meets certain
property. In general case, assume d is an n-bit number of bits dn−1...d1d0, then
d mod p = (
n−1∑
i=0
((di · 2i) mod p)) mod p
The logic operations for (di · 2i) mod p can be done in parallel and so can be the operations to
calculate their sum. The logic design can be further optimized if p is a preset value, and even
more if p is a certain specific value [101]. Finally, with m being a power of two, “x mod m” is
simply to select the least-significant log2(m) bits of x.
3.3.4 Extra ECC Traffic and ECC-Cache
The E3CC design may require an extra column access (read or write operation) to retrieve
the ECC bits for a given memory request. For DDR3 DIMM of full rank size and 64B memory
block access, it takes a single column access to transfer 64B data, and therefore in the worst case
transferring the ECC bits may double the number of column accesses (effectively more memory
bursts). Since only 72B of the 128B data are immediately needed, the potential bandwidth
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overhead from the extra 56B transfer is 77.8% from the baseline. For 32-bit and 16-bit sub-
ranked DIMMs, for each memory access it takes 3 and 5 column accesses for a device to fetch
32B and 16B data, respectively, and their ECC bits. The amount of extra bandwidth usage is
24B and 8B per request and the percentage of traffic increase is 33% and 11%, respectively, from
the baseline in the worst case. For 8-bit sub-ranked DIMM, there is no bandwidth overhead.
DDR2 also supports burst length of four, which can be used to reduce the overhead. Low-
power DDR2 supports burst length of four and the rank size is 32-bit, so the percentage of
worst-case bandwidth overhead starts from 11% (transferring 80B for 72B) and disappears at
16-bit sub-ranking, if burst of four is used.
To reduce this overhead, we propose to include a small ECC-cache in the memory controller
to buffer and reuse the extra ECC bits. The cache is a conventional cache with a block size
of 8B, and it utilizes the spatial locality in memory requests. We find that a 64-block, fully-
associative cache is sufficient to capture the spatial locality for most workloads; set-associative
cache can also be used.
It is worth noting that a partial write of an ECC super-column in DRAM does not require
reading the ECC column first. DDRx supports the use of data mask (DM) for partial data
write. The DM has eight bits. On a write operation, each bit may mask out eight data pins
from writing, and thus the update can be done by 8B granularity. Furthermore, our design
utilizes the burst-chop-4 feature of DDR3 on ECC writes to reduce the memory traffic overhead
and power overhead from writing ECC bits.
3.3.5 Reliability and Extension
E3CC can correct single random bit error and detect double random bits error happening
in DRAM cells. The study on LOT-ECC [103] identifies other types of failures and errors,
including row-failure, column-failure, row-column failure, pin failure, chip failure and multiple
random bits error, which can be covered by LOT-ECC. The first four types are stuck-at errors,
and can be covered by flipping the checksum bit in the error protection code. If the same idea
is used in the error protection code of E3CC, E3CC can also detect a single occurrence of those
failures, but may not be able to correct them. E3CC cannot guarantee the immediate detection
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of a pin failure, because it may cause multiple-bit errors in an ECC word on E3CC. However, a
pin failure also causes stuck-at errors, which with a high probability will be quickly detected by
consecutive ECC checking. Similarly, a chip failure may also be quickly detected but cannot be
recovered. Note that LOT-ECC is stronger than E3CC at the cost of higher storage overhead
(26.5% vs. 14.1%) and lower power efficiency. We argue that the E3CC design is suitable for
consumer-level computers and devices that require memory reliability enhancement with low
impact on cost and power efficiency.
The flexibility of E3CC enables the use of other error protection code for improved storage
overhead, reliability, power efficiency, and performance. Conventional ECC memory using the
Hamming-based (72, 64) SECDED code has a storage overhead of 12.5%. Hamming code is
actually a special case of BCH codes with minimum distance of 3 [71]. For memory blocks of
64B cacheline size, one may use very long BCH code such as BCH(522, 512), BCH(532, 512),
and BCH(542, 512) codes, which are SEC, DEC and TEC (Single-, Double- and Triple-bit
Error Correcting), respectively, for 512-bit data block. The storage overhead ratio is 1.95%,
3.9% and 5.9%, respectively. To use BCH code in E3CC, another set of address mapping logic
may be needed.
3.4 Experimental Methodologies
We have built a detailed main memory simulator for the conventional DDRx and the sub-
ranked memory system and integrated it into the Marssx86 [78] simulator. In the simulator, the
memory controller issues device-level memory commands based on the status of memory chan-
nels, ranks and banks, and schedules requests by hit-first and read-first policy, using cacheline-
interleaving and page-interleaving. We did experiments with the two cacheline-interleaving
schemes in Figure 3.5; they are very close in the average performance. The first cacheline-
interleaving scheme is used in the presented results. The basic XOR-mapping [119] scheme is
used as the default configuration for page interleaving to reduce the bank conflict.
Table 3.3 shows the major parameters for the simulation platform. The simulator mod-
els Micron device MT41J256M8 [69] in full detail. To model the power consumption, we
integrate a power simulator into the simulation platform using the Micron power calculation
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methodology [70]. It also models the DDR3 low power modes, with a proactive strategy to
put memory device in power-down modes with fast exit latency. We follow the method of a
previous study [121] to break down memory power consumption into background, operation,
read/write and I/O power. The details of memory power model are introduced in Section 2.2.
The power parameters are listed in Table 3.4.
Parameter Value
Processor 4 cores, 3.2GHz, 4-issue per core,14-stage pipeline
Functional units 2 IntALU, 4 LSU, 2 FPALU
IQ, ROB and LSQ size IQ 32, ROB 128, LQ 48, SQ 44
Physical register num 128 Int, 128 FP, 128 BR, 128 ST
Branch prediction
Combined, 6k Bimodal + 6k Two-level, 1K RAS, 4k-entry
and 4-way BTB
L1 caches (per core)
64KB Inst/64KB Data, 2-way, 16B line, hit latency: 3-
cycle Inst,3-cycle Data
L2 cache (shared) 4MB, 8-way, 64B line, 13-cycle hit latency
Memory
DDR3-1600, 2 channels, 2 DIMMs/channel, 2
ranks/DIMM, 8 banks/rank
Memory controller 64-entry buffer, 15ns overhead for scheduling and timing
DDR3 DRAM latency DDR3-1600:11-11-11
Table 3.3: Major simulation parameters.
Parameters Value
Normal voltage 1.5V
Active precharge current 95mA
Precharge power-down standby cur-
rent
35mA
Precharge standby current 42mA
Active power-down standby current 40mA
Active standby current 45mA
Read burst current 180mA
Write burst current 185mA
Burst refresh current 215mA
Table 3.4: Parameters for calculating power for 2Gbit, x8 DDR3-1600(11-11-11) device.
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Workload Applications Workload Applications
MEM-1 mcf, libquantum, soplex, milc ILP-1 gobmk, sjeng, gcc, namd
MEM-2 sphinx3, soplex, libquantum, mcf ILP-2 gobmk, sjeng, gcc, perlbench
MEM-3 lbm, mcf, soplex, sphinx3 ILP-3 gobmk, sjeng, deaIII, perlbench
MEM-4 mcf, libquantum, lbm, sphinx3 ILP-4 gobmk, deaIII, namd, perlbench
MEM-5 soplex, milc, lbm, milc ILP-5 sjeng, gcc, namd, perlbench
MEM-6 libquantum, lbm, milc, sphinx3 ILP-6 gcc, deaIII, namd, perlbench
MIX-1 lbm, sphinx3, deaIII, perlbench MIX-2 lbm, milc, deaIII, namd
MIX-3 libquantum, gcc, milc, namd MIX-4 soplex, sjeng, libquantum, gcc
MIX-5 gobmk, sphinx3, mcf, perlbench MIX-6 mcf, soplex, gobmk, sjeng
Table 3.5: Workload specifications.
3.4.1 Statistical Memory MTTF Model
Intuitively, SECDED will improve the memory reliability compared with non-ECC DIMM.
However, few studies directly report the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) in academy. We have
used a statistical MTTF model suggested by a previous study [75]. For a memory system using
SEC (Single-bit Error Correcting) codes, the system is considered operational until there are
two bits of error occurred within a single codeword. Assume the generation of failure bit in
memory is independent, random and follows Poisson process within time period T . We build
a fault simulator based on this error model. Monte Carlo method is used and random errors
are generated and injected to a memory system. When an error is injected, a check function
is called to estimate if the number of error bits in one codeword exceed the ECC capability.
If so, the simulator reports a system failure and records the failure time. Each experiment is
repeated for a sufficient number of times, and then the failure time records are used to calculate
the MTTF using the above MTTF model.
We simulate a quad-core system with each core running a distinct application from the
SPEC2006 [98] benchmark suits. We follow the method used in a previous study [52] to group
those benchmarks into three categories: MEM (memory-intensive), ILP (compute-intensive)
and MIX (mix of memory-intensive and compute-intensive) based on their L2 cache misses per
1000 instructions (L2 MPKI). The MEM applications are those benchmarks with L2 MPKI
greater than 10 and ILP applications are those with less than one L2 MPKI.
Table 3.5 shows 18 four-core multi-programming workloads randomly selected from those
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applications. The MEM workloads consist of memory-intensive applications, the ILP workloads
contain compute-intensive applications, and the MIX workloads have the MEM benchmarks
and ILP benchmarks mixed together. For each workload, we create a checkpoint after all
the benchmarks in one workload running to their typical phases. Then we collect the detailed
simulation results from user space for 200 million instructions.The performance is characterized
using SMT weighted speedup [96]
∑n
i (IPCmulti[i]/IPCsingle[i]), where n is the total number
of applications running, IPCmulti[i] is the IPC value of application i running under multi-core
environment and IPCsingle[i] is the IPC value of the same application running alone.
3.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we present and analyze the evaluation results of E3CC, including perfor-
mance, memory traffic overhead, and power efficiency. We have conducted experiments with the
full rank, 32-bit sub-ranked, and 16-bit sub-ranked memories, and with cacheline-interleaving
and page-interleaving.
3.5.1 Overall Performance of Full-Rank Memories
It is straightforward to use a conventional DDR3-1600 non-ECC memory as a baseline for
performance comparison. However, we also simulated a pseudo DDR3-1422 ECC DRAM with
a 72-bit width data bus running at 711MHz since it provides the same raw data bandwidth
with E3CC with a 64-bit data bus running at 800MHz. Note that the data rate of 1422MHz is
an artificial setting not used in practice.
Figure 3.7a compares the performance of the full-rank E3CC DDR3-1600 memory, without
and with ECC-cache, against full-rank DDR3-1600 baseline and the full-rank pseudo DDR3-
1422 memory. We first focus on the memory-intensive workloads. Without ECC-cache, E3CC
incurs an average performance loss of 9.1% and 13.7% with cacheline- and page- interleaving,
respectively. The performance loss comes from extra column access for ECC bits, which fetches
more ECC bits than necessary and thus incurs bandwidth overhead. It will be analyzed in
Section 3.5.3. ECC-cache effectively reduces the bandwidth overhead. With ECC-cache, the
performance loss is reduced to 5.1% with cacheline-interleaving and 7.4% with page-interleaving.
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When E3CC is compared with pseudo DDR3-1422, the performance overhead is 3.4% and 4.5%
for cacheline- and page- interleaving, respectively.
For mixed workloads, E3CC without ECC-cache incurs an average performance overhead
of 3.2% and 5.7% with the cacheline- and page- interleaving, respectively. With ECC-cache,
the performance overhead is reduced to 2.0% for cacheline-interleaving and 3.4% for page-
interleaving. When E3CC is compared with DDR3-1422, the performance losses are 1.0% and
2.0%, respectively. For ILP workloads, the average performance overhead is under 0.3% for
both interleaving schemes, as ILP workloads are not sensitive to memory performance from the
beginning.
3.5.2 Overall Performance of Sub-Ranked Memories
Figure 3.7b compares the performance of 32-bit sub-ranked E3CC DDR3-1600 memories
with sub-ranked DDR3-1600 baseline and pseudo DDR3-1422 memories. With sub-ranking,
the bandwidth overhead from fetching ECC bits is reduced significantly as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.4. For memory-intensive workloads and without ECC-cache, the average performance
overhead is 5.6% and 9.5% with cacheline- and page-interleaving, respectively. With ECC-
cache, the overhead is reduced to 3.7% and 5.5%, respectively. When E3CC is compared
with DDR3-1422, the overhead is further reduced to 1.3% and 1.6%, respectively. For mixed
workloads and without ECC-cache, the performance overheads are 2.3% and 4.0% from DDR3-
1600 with cacheline- and page-interleaving, respectively; and with ECC-cache, the overhead is
reduced to 1.7% and 2.5%, respectively. When E3CC is compared with DDR3-1422, the per-
formance difference is almost negligible.
Figure 3.7c compares the performance of 16-bit sub-ranked memories of the E3CC DDR3-
1600 type against the sub-ranked DDR3-1600 baseline and the pseudo DDR3-1422 type. For
memory-intensive workloads and without ECC-cache, the performance overhead is 4.3% and
6.5% for cacheline- and page-interleaving, respectively. With ECC-cache, the overhead is re-
duced to 2.9% for cacheline-interleaving and 3.6% for page-interleaving. When compared to
DDR3-1422, E3CC even improves the performance on page-interleaving. Although this sce-
nario seems to be counter-intuitive, it is possible because the fetch of extra ECC bits has an
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(a) Full-rank E3CC memory vs. full-rank DDR3-1600 memory, with full-rank DDR3-1422 included.
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(b) 32-bit sub-ranked E3CC memory vs. 32-bit sub-ranked DDR3-1600 memory, with 32-bit sub-ranked
DDR3-1422 included.
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(c) 16-bit sub-ranked E3CC memory vs. 16-bit sub-ranked DDR3-1600 memory, with 16-bit sub-ranked
DDR3-1422 included.
Figure 3.7: Performance of the E3CC DDR3-1600 memories and the baseline DDR3-1600
memories of different rank sizes. E3CC denotes E3CC.
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Figure 3.8: The extra read memory traffic caused by E3CC when ECC-cache is used.
effect of prefetch.
3.5.3 Memory Traffic Overhead and ECC-Cache
Figure 3.8 presents memory traffic overhead caused by E3CC when ECC-cache is used. As
memory read is critical to the system performance and only memory-intensive workloads are
sensitive to the memory traffic overhead, the figure presents only the memory read traffic for the
memory-intensive workloads. The average overhead is 29.0%, 17.1% and 6.5% for full-rank, 32-
bit sub-ranked and 16-bit sub-ranked memories, respectively, with cacheline-interleaving. And
with page-interleaving, the overhead is 9.8%, 7.3% and 4.1% for those three rank configura-
tions, respectively. The overhead is less with page-interleaving than with cacheline-interleaving
because page-interleaving retains row-level spatial locality in the program address space and
the ECC-cache can well capture the spatial locality. ECC-cache is still effective for cacheline
interleaving, as it still captures the spatial locality within multiple blocks sharing the same
ECC column.
Figures 3.9a and 3.9b show the ECC cache read hit rates for cacheline- and page-interleaving,
respectively. Overall, ECC-cache has a high read hit rate for memory-intensive workloads. The
average hit rates are 62.5% and 87.2% for x64-rank DIMM with cacheline-interleaving and page-
interleaving, respectively. Cacheline-interleaving distributes the memory requests among all the
ranks, which improves the accessing parallelism and reduces the row buffer hit rate. Therefore,
ECC cache hit rate for cacheline-interleaving is smaller than that of page-interleaving mode.
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Figure 3.9: ECC-cache read hit rate for mixed and memory-intensive workloads with cacheline-
and page-interleaving.
As the rank size decreases to x32 and x16, the cache hit rate is reduced because the program
locality is further broken as row buffer size shrinks. On average, the row buffer hit rates are
46.4% and 40.3% with cacheline-interleaving with x32 and x16 rank size, respectively; and
78.1% and 62.5% with page-interleaving, respectively.
3.5.4 Power Efficiency of E3CC Memories
As memory-intensive workloads are power hungry applications, we focus on the power
efficiency of these workloads. Figure 3.10 compares the power breakdown of full-rank and sub-
ranked memory without and with ECC. Sub-ranked memories without ECC are shown to give
a baseline reference for the corresponding sub-ranked E3CC memories, so as to show the power
efficiency of E3CC in each type of sub-ranked memory. Both are DDR3-1600 type. Consis-
tent with previous studies [121, 2, 1], sub-ranked memories reduce memory operation power
significantly as the sub-rank size decreases. The background power is also reduced moderately
because of the increased number of sub-ranks over the number of ranks, as more sub-ranks can
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Figure 3.10: Memory power breakdown into operation, read/write, I/O and background power
for full-rank and sub-ranked memories with and without ECC. E3CC denotes E3CC; ECC-cache
is used. Only memory-intensive workloads are shown. Sub-ranked memories without ECC are
used as reference baseline, with power calculated as that of regular sub-ranked memories plus
12.5% overhead. Both the baseline and E3CC are DDR3-1600 type.
be put into fast power-down mode to save background power. For page-interleaving, operation
power is not a significant component, because the row-buffer hit rate of those workloads is high
and therefore a less number of precharges and activations are needed.
E3CC achieves good power efficiency when compared with the baseline. The full-rank
baseline is actually the conventional full-rank ECC DIMM. The sub-ranked baselines correspond
to a design that extends sub-ranked memories ideally to implement ECC; for example, for 32-
bit sub-ranked memory of four x8 device per sub-rank, it extends the sub-rank bus to 36-bit
and adds an x4 device to store ECC bits, assuming that the x4 device consumes half power of
a x8 device.
36
We first focus on the full-rank memory. For cacheline-interleaving, E3CC increases the over-
all power rate of full-rank memory by 5.6% from the baseline. Regarding each power component,
the read/write power increases by 52.4% and I/O power by 23.7% but the background power
decreases by 9.9% and operation power by 4.5%. For page-interleaving, E3CC is almost the
same as the baseline, with the overall power rate decreased by 0.1%. It increases the read/write
power by 34.0% and I/O power by 9.1% but decreases the background power by 10.8% and
operation power by 25.1%. The read/write and I/O power increases come from accessing extra
ECC bits. ECC-cache is more effective on page-interleaving than on cacheline-interleaving, and
therefore the increases are less on the page-interleaving than on the cacheline-interleaving. The
background power is reduced because, compared with the baseline, there are 8 devices per rank
instead of 9. Operation power is reduced partially for a similar reason, as there are 8 devices
per rank to precharge and activate instead of 9. Additionally, we have found that the average
row buffer miss rate of page-interleaving is 15.9% with E3CC and 17.5% with the baseline,
which means less precharges and activations with E3CC. For all settings, because of the BCR
mapping, E3CC tends to have lower row-buffer miss rate than the baseline.
The power efficiency of E3CC vs. the baseline increases with sub-ranked memory because
of the decreased memory traffic overhead. For 32-bit sub-ranked memory with cacheline-
interleaving, E3CC on average reduces the overall power rate by 1.1%, with 10.7% decrease
of background power, 9.9% decrease of operation power, 22.3% increase of read/write power,
and 8.0% increase of I/O power. With page-interleaving, on average it reduces the overall power
rate by 4.6%, with 10.9% decrease of background power, 20.2% decrease of operation power,
13.6% increase of read/write power, and 0.6% increase of I/O power. For 16-bit sub-ranked
memory with cacheline-interleaving, E3CC on average reduces the overall power rate by 7.7%,
with changes of -11.0%, -14.7%, +1.8% and -5.2% on background, operation, read/write and
I/O power, respectively. With page-interleaving, it on average reduces the overall power rate by
6.1%, with changes of -10.5%, -13.4%, +5.4% and -2.1% on background, operation, read/write
and I/O power, respectively.
We have also found that while ECC-cache reduces the memory ECC read traffic efficiently,
it does not reduce the memory ECC write traffic as well because there is much less spatial
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locality in the write traffic than in the read traffic. The memory ECC write traffic is caused by
last-level cache writebacks, whose spatial locality is mostly lost because the relative timing of
writebacks is different from the relative timing of demand misses on the same set of memory
blocks. Although the extra write traffic only has a moderate impact on the performance of
those workloads, it does increase the read/write and I/O power. Our design uses the burst-
chop-4 to reduce the ECC write traffic and power consumption. The use of a different processor
cache writeback policy, for example eager writeback [55] or a revised scheme, may restore the
spatial locality in cache writebacks and therefore may help reduce this power increase. If so,
E3CC will be even more power-efficient.
3.5.5 Evaluation of Using Long BCH Code
As discussed in Section 3.3.5, the flexibility of E3CC may allow the use of very long BCH
code for improved storage efficiency and reliability. Because the storage overhead is reduced,
power efficiency and performance will also be improved. We have applied a statistical MTTF
model suggested by a previous study [75] and built a Monte-Carlo simulator that assumes the
generation of failure bit is independent, random and follows the Poisson process. The simulation
results have been further verified with mathematical model for evaluation. We have simulated
a 4GB memory system using BCH(512,522), BCH(512,532) and BCH(512,542), which are
SEC, DEC and TEC codes, respectively, and with 2.0%, 3.9% and 5.9% storage overhead,
respectively. We found that those long BCH codes may improve MTTF by two, four, and five
orders of magnitude, respectively.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented E3CC, a complete solution of memory error protection
for sub-ranked and low-power memories. A novel address mapping scheme called BCRM has
been found to implement page-interleaving on E3CC without using expensive integer division.
A simple and effective solution called ECC-cache is presented to reduce extra ECC traffic. We
have thoroughly evaluated the performance and power efficiency of E3CC. E3CC is suitable for
consumer-level computers and mobile devices used in applications that require a certain degree
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of reliable computing but desire a low impact on cost and power efficiency. E3CC does not
require any changes to memory devices or modules, further reducing the cost of manufacturing.
Furthermore, using ECC or not can be configured at system booting time, giving users the
flexibility to make trade-off between reliability, performance, and power efficiency.
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CHAPTER 4. EXPLORING FLEXIBLE MEMORY ADDRESS
MAPPING AT DEVICE LEVEL FOR SELECTIVE ERROR
PROTECTION
Memory error protection is increasingly important as memory density and capacity increase;
however, the protection comes with inherent storage and energy overhead. Selective error
protection (SEP) is desirable for reducing the overhead, particularly on mobile computers
and devices. In this chapter, we further explore flexible and efficient memory address mapping
schemes at DRAM device level to support SEP on commodity memory devices and conventional
modules in a reconfigurable manner, such that the physical memory address space can be split
into two memory regions without and with memory error protection, respectively.
4.1 Introduction
Diverse applications have been developed on mobile systems including tablets and smart-
phones. These applications react differently to memory errors. For most common smartphone
apps, including web-browsing, gaming, video player, audio player, and others, the program
data is generally non-critical or insensitive to memory errors. For example, an error in a frame
buffer during video processing may cause a pixel disruption in one frame, which is tolerant to
human eyes [95, 63]. In contrast, some apps like mobile banking and financing, or partial code
of apps like loop-control variables and others, are sensitive to errors. A recent study proposes
a methodology to quantify the difference; for example, a variable “ZCH” in lex benchmark is
evaluated to be around 1188 times more vulnerable than another variable “yychar” in the same
program [68]. For video processing, while errors in a frame buffer are not disruptive, errors
in vertex arrays and texture contents may cause visual discomfort because they disrupt the
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appearance of many frames [95].
Memory error protection in mobile systems must be done carefully. On one hand, in the
worst cases memory errors may incur severe consequences to systems and users, i.e. data
corruption, visual discomfort, security vulnerability [27, 108] and others. On the other hand, it
is a waste to protect the entire memory, because memory error protection incurs extra power
consumption and reduces battery usage time. Therefore, it is usually desired to only protect
critical code and data and leave the rest unprotected. For this purpose, a recent study proposes
a framework of Selective Error Protection (SEP) [68]. In that framework, the OS and compiler
place critical data (including code thereafter) in a designated protected region in the physical
memory address space based on a profile-based data criticality analysis. For example, data
and variables of high access frequency may be selected. The evaluation confirms that SEP can
provide high error coverage with low energy consumption.
However, the study does not fully investigate the memory system design to support an ECC
(Error Correcting Code)-protected region and a non-protected region; it simply assumes such
a mechanism exists, and then focuses on the higher layers of the framework. It is actually very
challenging to design such a memory system for mobile computers and devices or any computer
of a simple memory organization.
In this chapter, we investigate the mechanism to support an error-protected region and a
non-protected region on a simple memory system made by commodity memory devices. Specif-
ically, such a memory system can be viewed as a collection of memory devices organized in
channels and ranks without builtin support for ECC. We first employ Embedded ECC [121] to
support ECC in the protected region because embedded ECC is energy-efficient and does not
require an extra device to store ECC bits. The new challenge, however, is to fully address the
device-level memory address mapping with two memory regions.
This work is partially motivated by our previous work E3CC, a form of Embedded ECC
which stores ECC bits with data bits in the same DRAM row. In E3CC, we design an efficient
embedded ECC scheme for narrow-ranked low-power DRAM memories considering both relia-
bility and energy efficiency. Because of ECC embedding, the effective memory capacity is no
longer power-of-two. We therefore propose BCRM (Biased Chinese Remainder Mapping) for
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efficient device-level memory address mapping without using division. BCRM is used for the en-
tire physical memory address space. This chapter addresses a different problem, namely how to
split the address space into two regions with efficient device-level memory address mapping. In
our framework, we assume embedded ECC is used in the protected region. The non-protected
region, however, may not use power-to-two mapping because the two regions co-exist in the
same memory system and affect each other. With hardware support and software management,
their boundary may shift to vary the size of the two regions. The device-level address mapping
must accommodate this change.
We propose novel address mapping schemes to address the challenge. First, we extend
the CRM (Chinese Remainder Mapping) scheme to non-prime memory systems [25]. CRM
is designed for prime memory systems decades ago and it applies CRT (Chinese Remainder
Theorem) to do address translation. Similar to CRM, the proposed scheme uses modulo opera-
tion to replace Euclidean division. Second, for cases that CRM-based mapping is not adequate
to maintain DRAM accesses locality, we propose a section-based mapping scheme. It parti-
tions the coming physical addresses into sections based on greatest common divisor and applies
modulo-based mapping section by section. Generally, DRAM device-level address mapping ei-
ther distributes memory requests evenly among memory units for high parallelism or maintains
row buffer locality for low accessing latency. We thus propose adjustment-factors for the pro-
posed mapping schemes to maintain one of the two common properties1. The proposed schemes
can have multiple variations by extending different adjustment-factors or by combining these
schemes together. They, therefore, are flexible to favor system requirements in practice.
We have made the following contributions in this chapter:
• We propose C-SCM (CRM based Super-Column Mapping), which groups multiple columns
as a super-column to apply CRM.
• We propose C-SGM (CRM based Super-Group Mapping), which groups both rows and
columns as super-row and super-column, respectively, to apply CRM.
1In study [47], it shows that four cacheline blocks interleaving is optimal for many-core system considering
power, performance and fairness. It is not discussed in detail in our study but our proposed schemes can be
extended to maintain such a property.
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• We propose S-SRM (Section based Shift-Row Mapping), which is not based on CRM. It
can be adjusted to present good row buffer locality.
• We further propose adjustment-factors including adjusting-factor, breaking-factor and
shifting-factor. The proposed mapping schemes can have multiple variations by applying
different factors or by combining different schemes to present different properties. It hints
the design flexibility in practice to favor system requirements.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the background and
related work of the study. In Section 4.3, the SEP design challenges are presented in detail by
showing an example mapping layout. Section 4.4 devises multiple address mapping schemes
for different system requirements of SEP. In Section 4.5, we discuss various scenarios that our
proposed mapping schemes can be applied and Section 4.6 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Background and Related Work
4.2.1 Diverse Sensitivities of Data, Variables and Applications
Intuitively, data and variables of application programs may not be uniformly sensitive to
memory errors, in the sense how an error may impact a program’s output or behavior observed
by users or other computer systems. First, within an application, data and variables may exhibit
diverse sensitivities to memory errors. For example, pixel data in an image or a video clip is
insensitive to errors as a single pixel failure is mostly invisible to users. However, errors in other
data structures, like the texture contents or loop control variables, can lead to much more severe
consequences. A recent study [68] shows an example that variable “ZCH” in lex benchmark is
around 1,188 times more vulnerable to errors than variable “yychar” in 5,000 experiments. It
conducts a profile-based criticality evaluation and shows a case that 35.8% error protection can
achieve around 99% fault coverage. Another study [110] observes that the dynamic segment of
program memory is 18 times more sensitive to errors than the static segment. Second, different
applications show different levels of sensitivity to memory errors. For example, gaming, audio,
video and other multimedia applications, and web browsers are insensitive to memory errors
while banking, financing or mission critical applications are sensitive to errors. A study [97] has
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proposed PVF (Program Vulnerability Factor) to quantify application vulnerability to errors
and found diverse PVFs of programs; for example, PVFapplu = 86.2% and PVFequake = 48.9%
for the two SPEC CPU2000 benchmark programs.
4.2.2 DRAM Accessing Page Policies
There are two commonly used page policies: close-page and open-page. Close-page policy
attempts to precharge the opened row after column access so that incoming requests to other
rows can be served immediately. It targets to take advantage of memory access parallelism to
improve DRAM performance. Open-page policy, however, maintains a row open after column
access. It favors applications with high row buffer locality so that the following requests hit the
opened row and can be accessed without opening the row again. In general, open-page policy is
less energy efficient than close-page policy as it consumes more power to maintain a row open.
However, open-page policy can be more efficient for some applications as less row activations
are required. These two policies are equally important in practice and their variants have been
widely used among commodity machines.
4.2.3 Related Work
Memory error protection has been widely studied [113, 114, 103, 73, 68]. Virtualized
ECC [113, 114] proposes to maintain ECC in memory data space and relies on last level cache
to cache unused ECC to reduce memory traffic. The design is flexible and efficient compared
to conventional SECDED DIMM. LOT-ECC [103] proposes a tiered ECC protection to pro-
vide Chipkill-level protect with merely nine (x8) DRAM devices. Archshield [73] proposes an
architectural-level framework to protect fabrication faulty cells caused by extreme scaling of
DRAM. All those studies apply error protection to the entire memory space. A recent study [68]
proposes SEP for low-cost memory protection, which is closely related to our work. The details
have been discussed in Section 4.1. Other works [12, 56] also discuss selective data protections.
By comparison, this work is focused on device-level memory address mapping to support SEP.
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One DIMM banks
Non-ECC region
ECC region
Figure 4.1: Example row-index based partitioning for selective protection. Part of the rows on
all banks are protected by ECC while others are not.
4.3 Problem Presentation
When memory space is partitioned into two regions, the effective capacity of the two re-
gions may no longer be power-of-two. It introduces challenges of DRAM device-level address
decomposition given that complex Euclidean division should be avoided [25]. In this section,
we analyze the problem in detail and show an example mapping layout to motivate our study.
4.3.1 DRAM Device-Level Address Mapping
In Chapter 3, the detailed DRAM address mapping of cacheline- and page- interleaving
schemes are presented. As shown in Figure 3.5, cacheline-interleaving scheme maps the least
significant bits of block address to channel index, followed by DIMM2, rank, etc. It attempts
to map continuous memory requests evenly to different channels, DIMMs, ranks and others.
Therefore, it typically works with close-page policy for high parallelism. On the contrary, page-
interleaving scheme breaks the least significant bits to column indexes. It therefore maintains
DRAM row buffer locality as continuous addresses within a page boundary are mapped to the
same DRAM row. With open-page policy, page-interleaving scheme retains the spatial locality
in a program’s access pattern and reduces memory access latency. These two interleaving-
schemes are equally important in practice, similar to the two page policies, as they present either
high parallelism or high locality. We thus denote the two properties as access-parallelism and
access-locality, respectively, to simplify our presentation, and our proposed mapping schemes
should retain these properties.
2If DIMM is not applicable like in smartphones, number of its index bits is 0.
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4.3.2 Address Mapping Issue in SEP
In SEP, memory space is partitioned into two regions for different error protection strategies.
In order to make the partitioning flexible and generic, we divide the two regions by row index in
each bank. Figure 4.1 shows an example partitioning. For rows in each bank with row indexes
greater than a given parameter, they are protected by ECC and the remaining rows are not.
This partitioning is flexible as a typical DDRx device contains a large number of rows, 32K
for example. One can alternatively partition the space by other indexes, i.e. channel, DIMM,
rank, bank, etc. However, there are drawbacks. First, partitioning by channel, DIMM, rank or
bank presents less flexibility as the number of those units can be limited in a system. Moreover,
partitioning by column index is inappropriate as it reduces page size of one region and thus
the maximum page locality. In addition, all those alternatives share the same issue with row-
indexed partitioning in SEP implementation as one region might have a non-power-of-two size.
Therefore, all of our following discussions assume row-indexed partitioning.
The major concern with partitioning is how to map a physical address to a designated
region since its capacity may not be power-of-two. Conventional interleaving schemes require a
power-of-two system for address decomposition. Without this prerequisite, the mapping can be
wrong. To further clarify the problem, we show an example below. Without losing generality,
all channel, DIMM, rank and bank indexes are ignored in the presentation for simplicity. The
mapping issue is thus reduced to map a physical address d ∈ [0, R ·C − 1] to a 2D array LR×C .
Let R = 8, C = 8 in entire space. In a case that property of access-parallelism is required by
the system, without partitioning, cacheline-interleaving scheme can be employed. The layout
is shown in Table 4.1. With cacheline-interleaving scheme, the lower three bits of the address
are the row index and the upper three bits are the column index. For example, address 49
(110001 in binary) maps to row 1 and column 6 (starting from 0) since row index and column
index are 001 and 110, in binary, respectively.
However, conventional address mapping may not work when the space is partitioned into
two regions. Assume an example partitioning ratio of 3 : 1 for non-ECC region and ECC
region, the upper six rows are thus not protected while the remaining two rows are protected
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row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56
1 1 9 17 25 33 41 49 57
2 2 10 18 26 34 42 50 58
3 3 11 19 27 35 43 51 59
4 4 12 20 28 36 44 52 60
5 5 13 21 29 37 45 53 61
6 6 14 22 30 38 46 54 62
7 7 15 23 31 39 47 55 63
Table 4.1: An example layout of the entire space with cacheline-interleaving scheme assuming
R = 8, C = 8.
row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
2 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
3 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
4 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
5 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
Table 4.2: An example layout with page-interleaving scheme for the region with six rows without
ECC protection.
by ECC based on the row-indexed partitioning. With such partitioning, addresses d ∈ [0, 47]
are required to map to L6×8, namely row [0, 5] by column [0, 7]. As there are merely six rows
in the non-protected region, it is challenging to apply cacheline-interleaving scheme. If one
simply takes the last three bits of physical address as row index, the addresses d ∈ [0, 47] are
mapped to L8×6 instead of the required L6×8. One can propose to use page-interleaving scheme
to map addresses into L6×8 as shown in Table 4.2. However, it presents access-locality instead
of the required access-parallelism. One can even propose complex division-based mapping
scheme. However it is not allowed in practice due to division complexity and harm to system
performance and power efficiency as presented in Chapter 3. We thus devise novel address
mapping schemes to resolve this challenge for implementation of selective protection.
47
D B4 D D D D D D E D D D D D D D D E …...
ECC2rows
non-ECC2
rows
The25th DRAM2device2in2a28x82
DIMM2with282internal2banks
The22nd block2within2a2row.2The2512-bit2block2splits2into2eight264-
bit2sub-blocks2and2distributes2to2eight2x82DRAM2devices
B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7
D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D …...D D
Address2
comparator
Figure 4.2: Overview of SEP design and data/ECC layout. Cacheline size is 512 bits inside a
row and SECDED (72,64) code is applied for error protection.
4.4 Novel Address Mapping Schemes
In this section, we first present the particular SEP design and then devise generic address
mapping schemes mathematically, considering various combinations of number of rows and
columns. In the end, we show case studies for applying the proposed mapping schemes on real
DDRx memory system for selective protection.
4.4.1 SEP Design Overview
In SEP memory, one region is reserved to be protected by ECC. Memory data is selectively
transferred between memory controller and DRAM devices via ECC unit if its address is within
the protected region. The memory controller maintains in a register the address of the boundary
between the two regions. For addresses greater than or equal to the boundary address, the
requests are protected by ECC. Otherwise, ECC circuitry is bypassed. The SEP framework
can be referred to study [68].
At DRAM level, the error-protected region requires extra storage for ECC redundancy. As
part of memory space is not protected, the conventional way to add an extra DRAM device is
inappropriate. We employ the embedded ECC scheme [121], which stores ECC bits with data
in the same DRAM row to reduce the energy consumption in accessing ECC bits. Figure 4.2
presents an example data and ECC layout of the SEP design. Given a positive output from
address comparator, the memory request falls into ECC region and its ECC redundancy is
placed following the data. With SECDED protection, 8-byte ECC is generated for each 64-
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byte cacheline block. Therefore, there is one ECC block following every eight data blocks in a
DRAM row. The in-block ECC layout is similar to that of E3CC presented in Chapter 3.
4.4.2 Exploring Generic Address Mapping Schemes
As presented in Section 4.3, the DRAM device-level address mapping issue emerges when
the space is split into two regions. We thus devise novel and efficient mapping schemes to resolve
this challenge. First, we discuss CRM (Chinese Remainder Mapping) scheme as multiple of
our proposed schemes are based on it. Then we illustrate the devised mappings case by case
to cover all possible combinations of number of rows and columns.
CRM was proposed relying on CRT (Chinese Remainder Theorem) [25] for prime memory
systems. It maps a physical address d ∈ [0, RC − 1] to a position in the 2D array LR×C one to
one using the following formula3:
r = d mod R, c = d mod C
, in which r and c are row and column indexes of the array and r ∈ [0, R − 1], c ∈ [0, C − 1].
CRM guarantees that the translation from d to a 〈r, c〉 pair is a one-to-one mapping given the
prerequisite that R and C are coprime.
Table 4.3 shows an example layout of a block address d with this mapping, assuming
R = 7, C = 8. Using the CRM formula, address d ∈ [0, 55] is translated to a position in the 2D
array correspondingly. For example, d = 50 maps to 〈1, 2〉 (starting from 0). In the mapping,
every address is translated to exactly one designated position and each position of the 2D array
is addressed by exactly one d.
In SEP with a simple memory system of commodity devices, the address mapping is more
complicated for two reasons. First, the number of rows and columns may not be coprime as
required in CRM. Second, as discussed in Section 4.3.1, either access-parallelism or access-
locality is usually required to maintain for practical system. For all the following discussions,
define g = gcd(R,C), in which g is the GCD (Greatest Common Divisor) of R and C. Our
3The notations are different from that in paper [25].
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row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 49 42 35 28 21 14 7
1 8 1 50 43 36 29 22 15
2 16 9 2 51 44 37 30 23
3 24 17 10 3 52 45 38 31
4 32 25 18 11 4 53 46 39
5 40 33 26 19 12 5 54 47
6 48 41 34 27 20 13 6 55
Table 4.3: An example layout of Chinese Remainder Mapping assuming R = 7, C = 8.
discussions focus on the case that g is 2n, which is true in most cases in real DDRx system as
shown in Section 4.4.3. Let |g| = log2(g). We thus have the following two cases based on g.
Case I: g = gcd(R,C) > 1 and gcd(R,C/g) = 1. In this case, R and C are not coprime
but R and C/g are coprime. We thus propose C-SCM (CRM based Super-Column Mapping)
using the following formula:
r = ds mod R
c = (ds mod t) |g|+ (d mod g)
(4.1)
where ds = d  |g|, which is called super-address, t = C  |g|, which is called super-column,
and ds ∈ [0, Rt − 1]. By grouping multiple columns together, the number of rows and super-
columns are coprime and thus the CRM scheme can be applied. This mapping is rational as
it simply extends CRM to an array with the same number of rows and a reduced number
of super-columns. The left-shift operation in expression of c expands the super-columns to
normal columns by a scaling-factor g and (d mod g) calculates the offset of the mapping inside
a super-column.
Table 4.4 presents an example layout with the proposed C-SCM scheme assuming R =
8, C = 6. In the example, g = 2 and |g| = 1. Thus two columns are grouped as a super-column.
The addresses with same super-address are mapped to the same super-column. For example,
super-address ds of addresses d = 2, 3 is 1 and it is mapped to row 1, super-column 1. By
scaling the super-column, addresses d = 2, 3 map to normal columns 2 and 3, respectively.
The example above maps addresses within range of g to the same row, which diverges
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row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 1 32 33 16 17
1 18 19 2 3 34 35
2 36 37 20 21 4 5
3 6 7 38 39 22 23
4 24 25 8 9 40 41
5 42 43 26 27 10 11
6 12 13 44 45 28 29
7 30 31 14 15 46 47
Table 4.4: An example layout of C-SCM with R = 8, C = 6.
slightly from access-parallelism. To maintain access-parallelism, one can apply XOR mapping
scheme [119] first before this mapping. For this layout, we propose breaking-factor to break the
small locality within range of g so that memory requests are evenly distributed into memory
units. The selection of breaking-factor is to map the logically continuous addresses to different
rows so that they are physically scattered. There can be multiple options of breaking-factor. In
this example, we use “+c” as the factor and r is thus updated to r = (ds+c) mod R. Table 4.5a
shows the updated layout. As it shows, the small locality of size g is completely broken. For
example, addresses 2 and 3 now map to rows 3 and 4, respectively. All the continuous addresses
are now in different rows.
In case that access-locality is required in practice, the proposed C-SCM cannot be applied
directly as it shortens row buffer locality to a smaller size g. Similar to breaking-factor, we
propose to add an adjusting-factor to draw back the offset of the mapping. We observe that
a continuous set of ds’s are mapped to physically continuous rows. Therefore, by adding an
offset “−(ds mod t)” in calculating row index, the biased row indexes are adjusted. r is thus
updated to r = (ds − (ds mod t)) mod R. Similar method is proposed in Chapter 3. However,
we explicitly write it with super-column assumption and BCRM (Biased Chinese Remainder
Mapping) is just a particular case of this study. Table 4.5b shows the updated layout. All
the continuous addresses within a row boundary are now mapped to the same row and the
maximum row buffer locality is maintained.
The rationality of the two adjustment factors introduced in C-SCM is similar to that of the
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row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 31 44 27 40 23
1 18 1 14 45 10 41
2 36 19 32 15 28 11
3 6 37 2 33 46 29
4 24 7 20 3 16 47
5 42 25 38 21 34 17
6 12 43 8 39 4 35
7 30 13 26 9 22 5
(a) An example layout of C-SCM with breaking-
factor c.
row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 1 2 3 4 5
1 18 19 20 21 22 23
2 36 37 38 39 40 41
3 6 7 8 9 10 11
4 24 25 26 27 28 29
5 42 43 44 45 46 47
6 12 13 14 15 16 17
7 30 31 32 33 34 35
(b) An example layout of C-SCM with adjusting-
factor −(ds mod t).
row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 31 14 45 28 11
1 18 1 32 15 46 29
2 36 19 2 33 16 47
3 6 37 20 3 34 17
4 24 7 38 21 4 35
5 42 25 8 39 22 5
6 12 43 26 9 40 23
7 30 13 44 27 10 41
(c) An example layout of C-SCM with both
adjusting-factor −(ds mod t) and breaking-factor
+c.
Table 4.5: Example layouts of C-SCM with breaking-factor and adjusting-factor, assuming
R = 8, C = 6.
bias-factor in Chapter 3. In addition, one can apply both breaking-factor following adjusting-
factor to the mapping scheme. It presents a different layout as shown in Table 4.5c by expression
r = (ds−(ds mod t)+c) mod R. In practice, one can explore more variations to meet particular
requirements.
Similar to C-SCM, one can have C-SRM (CRM based Super-Row Mapping) as long as the
number of super-rows is a coprime with the number of columns. The detail of C-SRM is not
presented and it can be applied straightforwardly following C-SCM. Table 4.6 shows an example
layout with C-SRM assuming R = 6, C = 8. Addresses with same super-address now map to
the same super-row. For example, addresses 32 and 33 are mapped to super-row 1 as their
super-address are both 16. This mapping scheme can be one solution for the problem presented
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row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 18 36 6 24 42 12 30
1 1 19 37 7 25 43 13 31
2 32 2 20 38 8 26 44 14
3 33 3 21 39 9 27 45 15
4 16 34 4 22 40 10 28 46
5 17 35 5 23 41 11 29 47
Table 4.6: An example layout of C-SRM with R = 6, C = 8.
in Section 4.3.
Case II: (g = gcd(R,C) > 1) and (gcd(R,C/g) > 1). In this case, the number of rows
and the number of super-columns are non-coprime. The proposed C-SCM can not be applied.
If gcd(R/g,C) = 1, C-SRM is feasible for this case. However, as shown in Table 4.6, it is
challenging to maintain the row buffer locality. In addition, it does not work if gcd(R/g,C) > 1.
We therefore propose a new scheme called C-SGM (CRM based Super-Group Mapping) which
works even if gcd(R/g,C) > 1. The mapping is done with the following formula, in which
s = R |g|, t = C  |g|; and ds = d (|g|  1), ds ∈ [0, s · t− 1].
r = (ds mod s) |g|+ ((d |g|) mod g)
c = (ds mod t) |g|+ (d mod g)
(4.2)
The rationality of this scheme is that it groups multiple rows and columns separately into
super-row and super-column, denoted as s and t, respectively. As s and t are coprime, the
mapping from ds to Ls×t can apply CRM. The second step in Formula 4.2 is to expand the
super-row and super-column to normal rows and columns by the scaling-factor g and map
addresses to the inner-group array Lg×g. This is obtained by recursively applying the proposed
C-SCM by grouping multiple columns as a super-column. In other words, it maps address
d ∈ [0, g · g− 1] to Lg×g by C-SCM. With the two steps decomposition, address d is mapped to
the 2D array one to one.
Table 4.7 shows an example layout of block addresses with the proposed C-SGM assuming
R = 6, C = 8. In the mapping, g = 2 and |g| = 1. Thus, two rows are grouped as a
super-row and two columns are grouped as a super-column. The addresses d’s with same ds are
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row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 1 36 37 24 25 12 13
1 2 3 38 39 26 27 14 15
2 16 17 4 5 40 41 28 29
3 18 19 6 7 42 43 30 31
4 32 33 20 21 8 9 44 45
5 34 35 22 23 10 11 46 47
Table 4.7: An example layout of C-SGM scheme with R = 6, C = 8.
mapped to same super-row and super-column index. For example, super-address ds of addresses
d = 4, 5, 6, 7 is 1, therefore all these addresses map to super-row 1 super-column 1. In the second
step of proposed C-SGM scheme, we apply C-SCM to map to the inner super-group mapping
and C-SRM can also be used for particular requirement.
The proposed C-SGM scheme can map address d ∈ [0, 47] to designated region of L6×8.
However, it does not maintain the property of access-parallelism or access-locality. One can
explore XOR mapping [119] or adjustment factors with C-SGM. In this study, though, we
explore a new scheme called S-SRM (Section based Shift-Row Mapping), which is not based on
CRM. We divide the address space into sections based on the GCD g, in which g = gcd(R,C).
S-SRM can be written in the following formula:
c = d mod C
r = (d+ i) mod R
(4.3)
In above formula, i = b(d · g)/(R · C)c and i ∈ [0, g − 1]. Table 4.8a shows an example
layout of S-SRM. It is a one to one mapping that continuous addresses are mapped to different
rows. Therefore, access-parallelism is maintained and this scheme can be a solution to the
problem presented in Section 4.3. In case that access-locality is required, adjusting-factor can
be applied to draw back row buffer locality. With adjusting-factor “−c”, r is updated to
r = (d+ i− c) mod R. The adjusted layout is shown in Table 4.8b.
The rationality of S-SRM relies on the introduced i, which is called shifting-factor. It plays
two major roles. First, it partitions the address space d into g sections, denoted as section i
each. In above example, g = 2 and d is thus partitioned into two sections with d0 ∈ [0, 23] and
d1 ∈ [24, 47], the subscript of d denotes i. Second, the shifting-factor i shifts the mapping of the
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row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 41 18 35 12 29 6 47
1 24 1 42 19 36 13 30 7
2 8 25 2 43 20 37 14 31
3 32 9 26 3 44 21 38 15
4 16 33 10 27 4 45 22 39
5 40 17 34 11 28 5 46 23
(a) An example layout of S-SRM without adjusting-factor.
row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
2 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
3 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
4 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
5 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
(b) An example layout of S-SRM with adjusting-factor “−c”.
Table 4.8: Example layouts comparison using S-SRM with and without adjusting-factor as-
suming R = 6, C = 8.
entire section by an offset of i, which otherwise is mapped to the same positions with section
of i = 0. For example, these two example sections will map to exactly the same row and same
column in the 2D array without shifting-factor. Table 4.9 shows such layouts. The unmapped
positions are marked as “x”. It is obvious that address sets d + i · RC/g are mapped to the
same positions for different integer i ∈ [0, g − 1]. For example, addresses d = 0, 24 are mapped
to 〈0, 0〉; d = 13, 37 are mapped to 〈1, 5〉. We thus come to S-SRM scheme to shift the row
indexes of different address sets by its shifting-factor. With this adjustment, the translation
maintains a one-to-one mapping.
We prove here that S-SRM is a one-to-one mapping. Given R = mg,C = ng, gcd(m,n) =
1, d ∈ [0,mng − 1], formula
x = d mod R, y = d mod C
maps d to a pair of integers 〈x, y〉 one to one. To prove the statement, Let dp = pR + x0 and
p is the integer quotient, therefore, dp mod R ≡ x0. Since d ∈ [0,mng − 1], p ≤ n − 1. Let
yp = dp mod C. Now, we merely need to prove that for all p, dp maps to different yp. Assume
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row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 x 18 x 12 x 6 x
1 x 1 x 19 x 13 x 7
2 8 x 2 x 20 x 14 x
3 x 9 x 3 x 21 x 15
4 16 x 10 x 4 x 22 x
5 x 17 x 11 x 5 x 23
(a) An example layout of S-SRM with d0 ∈ [0, 23], i = 0.
row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 24 x 42 x 36 x 30 x
1 x 25 x 43 x 37 x 31
2 32 x 26 x 44 x 38 x
3 x 33 x 27 x 45 x 39
4 40 x 34 x 28 x 46 x
5 x 41 x 35 x 29 x 47
(b) An example layout of S-SRM with d1 ∈ [24, 47], i = 1.
Table 4.9: Example layouts with S-SRM without applying shifting-factor i for the two sections
of address d ∈ [0, 47] assuming R = 6, C = 8.
there is a p′ different from p such that yp′ = yp. Then
yp = pmg + x0 − qng
yp′ = p′mg + x0 − q′ng
Since yp′ = yp, we have
(p− p′)m = (q − q′)n
Note that p, p′, q, q′ are all integers and p, p′ ∈ [0, n− 1]; q, q′ ∈ [0,m− 1], m and n are coprime.
The only condition that the above formula is right is p = p′ and q = q′. Therefore, the
assumption is invalid. We thus have the statement proved.
The proposed S-SRM can have multiple variations. One can shift column to adjust the
layout instead of shifting row to have S-SCM (Section based Shift-Column Mapping). In addi-
tion, one can combine S-SRM with C-SCM to group multiple columns as a super-column and
then apply S-SRM. Formula 4.4 shows an example equation combining C-SCM and S-SRM
together. In the formula, ds = d |g|, t = C  |g| which are super-address and super-column,
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row/col 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 1 34 35 12 13 46 47
1 24 25 2 3 36 37 14 15
2 16 17 26 27 4 5 38 39
3 40 41 18 19 28 29 6 7
4 8 9 42 43 20 21 30 31
5 32 33 10 11 44 45 22 23
Table 4.10: An example layout with combination of S-SRM and C-SCM, assuming R = 6, C =
8.
respectively. Table 4.10 shows an example layout using this formula.
c = (ds mod t) |g|+ (d mod g)
r = (ds + i) mod R
(4.4)
The proposed S-SRM can be adjusted to maintain row buffer locality. However, S-SRM
requires complex multiplication and division operations to calculate the shifting-factor i. This
can be resolved in real machine by adding a small RAM or ROM to maintain the address range
for each i given that g is generally a small value. In above example, g = 2, value B = 24 can
be maintained such that i = 0 for d < B and i = 1 for d ≥ B.
4.4.3 Case Study of Real DDR3 System With SEP
In previous section, we discuss all the address mapping schemes for different cases mathe-
matically. In this section, we show case studies of applying the proposed mapping schemes in
real DDRx memory system for selective protection.
Without losing generality, we assume an example memory system in our following discus-
sions. The memory system has two DRAM channels with two DIMMs per channel and two
ranks per DIMM. Each rank contains eight x8 DRAM devices, assuming Micron DDR3-1600
MT41J256M8 device [69] in this example. It is a 2Gbit chip with eight internal banks and each
bank has 32K rows, 1K columns, and 8 bits per column. Assume SEP divides the space into
two regions with ratio 3 : 1 and let the upper region, denoted as x, have 215 × 34 rows and the
lower region, denoted as y, have 215× 14 rows. In a case that region x is not protected by ECC
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bank rank DIMM channel offset
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Step 1
Step 2a Step 2b
Figure 4.3: Address decomposition procedure.
and it requires access-parallelism, conventional cacheline-interleaving scheme cannot be applied
to resolve its address mapping. In this case4,
Rx = 2
13 × 3, Cx = 27, gcd(Rx, Cx) = Cx
Therefore, Formula 4.1 can be used. By grouping all the columns as a super-column, CRM
based mapping scheme is applicable. Figure 4.3 shows the detailed address decomposition
procedure. In step 1, the physical address can be decomposed directly into lower 12 bits and
the remaining upper-bits. The lower-bits include bank, rank, DIMM, channel and block-offset.
In step 2b, these lower-bits are split into corresponding indexes as all of them are power-of-two.
Step 2a is completed by Formula 4.1 that r = (d  7) mod Rx, c = d mod Cx. To maintain
access-parallelism, a breaking-factor “+c” can be added in expression r, which is explained
previously. The above formula requires modulo 213 × 3 and modulo 2n operations. Modulo 2n
is simply the last n bits of address d and we prove in Section 4.4.4 that modulo 213 ×m can
be converted to modulo m operation, which can be done efficiently.
In above case, if region x requires ECC protection, its number of columns is shrunk to
a non-power-of-two value. As each 64-byte data block requires 8 bytes ECC with SECDED
scheme, the effective number of columns is thus Cx = 2
10/9 = 113. A modulo operation of 113
can introduce certain complexity in hardware implementation in practice. We thus use merely
112 columns as a trade-off between complexity and capacity. Therefore,
Rx = 2
13 × 3, Cx = 24 × 7, gcd(Rx, Cx) = 24
4In a 64-bit rank, eight columns are accessed continuously to burst a 64-byte block. Cx is thus 2
7 by removing
3 bits block offsets for a typical 64-byte block.
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Similarly, the proposed C-SCM scheme can be applied and proper adjusting-factor can be
added if needed. In this example, S-SRM can also be applied for address mapping. Given
gcd(Rx, Cx) = 2
4, 15 reference addresses are required to divide the physical address space into
16 sections. By applying Formula 4.3, the mapping is done by modulo Rx and Cx.
The SEP design can introduce various combinations of R and C as the partitioning can be
flexible and diverse forms of ECCs can be employed other than SECDED code. The proposed
mapping schemes can be applied correspondingly. However, the flexibility may be limited
slightly in practice considering the complexity of hardware implementation. One may also
make trade-off between valid DRAM capacity and hardware simplicity.
4.4.4 Hardware Implementation of Modulo Operation
In real DDRx memory system with the proposed address mapping, the following modulo
operation is generally required:
v mod (m× 2n)
where m is a small value. We prove that the above modulo (m × 2n) operation can deduce
to modulo (m) operation, which can be resolved efficiently. The deduction is obtained by the
following formula:
v mod (m× 2n) = ((v  n) mod m) n+ (v & (2n − 1))
where & is a bit-wise AND operation. The core part of the proof is to regard the data in binary
representation. Assume v = h n+ l, where l is the lower n bits of v and h is the higher bits.
We thus have l < 2n. Let h = mk + r, where r = h mod m. Given the two basic properties of
modulo operation [101]
(a+ b) mod m = ((a mod m) + (b mod m)) mod m
(a · b) mod m = ((a mod m) · (b mod m)) mod m
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The proof is done by following steps:
v mod (m× 2n)
= ((h · 2n) mod (m · 2n) + l mod (m · 2n)) mod (m · 2n)
= (((mk + r) · 2n) mod (m · 2n) + l) mod (m · 2n)
= (r · 2n + l) mod (m · 2n)
= r · 2n + l
Based on the basic properties of modulo operation, a modulo small number operation can
be done as follows:
v mod m =
n−1∑
i=0
(vi · (2i mod m)) mod m
where vi is the corresponding ith bit of v in binary representation. When m is set, the for-
mula can be further simplified as (2i mod m) has finite outcomes. For example, Teng [101]
shows that a simple logic can be implemented to resolve modulo 7 operation as 2i mod 7 =
1, 2, 4, 1, 2, 4 · · · , (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 · · · ). Therefore, a modulo m operation is deduced to addi-
tion operation. The corresponding ith bit of v is used as a filter to decide whether one of the
three outcomes is added to obtain the result. Similar to modulo 7 operation, one can have
repeated outcomes for other small numbers for 2i. Therefore, the modulo operation can be
done efficiently. In practice, one can add a small SRAM in memory controller for maintaining
these remainders for a preset value m. The SRAM can be reconfigured based on the specified
reference address in partitioning register.
4.4.5 Other Discussions
The proposed address mapping schemes can be extended for memory systems with more
regions for various error protections. For example, a system can have three regions with one un-
protected, one with SECDED protection and the remaining one with BCH DECTED (Double-
bit Error Correcting Triple-bit Error Detecting), respectively. Such a partitioning further tunes
the system in fine granularity for strong reliability while maintaining efficient energy consump-
tion.
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4.5 Discussion of Application Scenarios
The proposed address mapping schemes make SEP a viable design in real DDRx systems.
All these schemes can be applied but not limited to the following scenarios.
4.5.1 OS and Compiler Aided Selective Protection
There can be multiple ways to apply SEP in real machines. First, Mehrara et al. [68] pro-
pose a profile-based criticality analysis to determine the vulnerability of data, text, variables,
etc. of a program. The liveness based profile study prioritizes code and data that are fre-
quently accessed and places them in error-protected memory region. Second, Chen et al. [12]
use a program slicing [106] based approach to optimize compiler to place the set of elements
requiring protection in error tolerant region of SEP. Furthermore, Oz et al. [77, 76] propose
TVF (Thread Vulnerability Factor) to quantify vulnerability of multithreaded applications and
further propose core partitioning based on TVF considering both performance and reliability.
It hints a core partitioning based policy with SEP hardware design. In addition, one can even
apply user-specified data criticality to tell OS and compiler which part of data requires protec-
tion and SEP facilitates this purpose. All these strategies require OS and compiler for placing
the sensitive data. The details are beyond our study.
4.5.2 Selective Protection to Lower Refresh Frequency
There have been multiple studies [62, 61, 107, 19, 48] focusing on reducing refresh frequency
of DRAM memories to improve power efficiency and performance. Refresh command is essential
to DRAM technologies to recharge memory cells in certain period to maintain data integrity.
Otherwise, data loses as charges on a cell leak away. As DRAM capacity and density are
growing, more refresh operations are required for each DRAM bank and they can introduce
significant overhead in terms of performance and power consumption. Studies [107, 19, 48] have
proposed to add ECC to tolerate errors in DRAM cache or main memory caused by reduced
refresh rate. In detail, study [19] observes leakage errors are unidirection from 1s to 0s and
therefore Berger Code can be applied to detect arbitrary number of errors (no correction is
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possible). It further shows that DRAM refresh rate can be reduced to 4x time by applying
single-bit error correction. With all these schemes, our proposed address mapping can be
applied to organize and address ECC codeword. The implementation, though, requires careful
design as SEP itself introduces overhead and error tolerant capability is limited.
4.5.3 Selective Protection to High Error Rate Region
Recent studies [92, 33] measure error rate and study error properties on DRAM systems
on large scale real machines. They both observe that errors are not distributed uniformly on
memory system. Particularly, study [33] observes that the top and bottom of the row/column
space in a bank is more likely to experience errors. In addition, errors tend to cluster on
same row, same column and their nearby rows and columns. That means the error rate of the
rows and columns is high once they have experienced errors. All these observations hint for
SEP scheme that selective error protection can be applied to these regions to tolerate errors
while limit area and power cost by reliability design. As the regions with high error rate can
physically distributed in a bank, it is challenging to apply SEP with the proposed address
mapping straightforwardly. One can propose to add a simple logic to reorganize the physically
scattered rows to be logically continuous. Therefore, the memory space can be divided into two
continuous regions logically and our proposed address mapping schemes can be simply applied.
4.5.4 Balancing DRAM Access Locality and Parallelism
In conventional DDRx memory system, either cacheline-interleaving or page-interleaving
scheme is deployed and the system either maintains access-parallelism or access-locality. Due
to diversities of applications and workloads, such a system can be inefficient since merely one
property is maintained. Study [44] proposes to partition internal memory banks between cores
to maintain DRAM accesses locality since requests interferences from other cores are isolated.
In addition, they propose to compensate the reduced bank parallelism with sub-ranking scheme.
Similar to their study, one can have different partitions for both locality and parallelism in one
system. For example, a low-level in-bank partitioning can be applied, in which requests with
high locality are placed in same DRAM rows targeting high row buffer hit ratio while requests
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with low locality are distributed into multiple banks for high parallelism. Such a design requires
memory requests characterization of different workloads. As in-bank partitioning can form a
non-power-of-two region, our proposed scheme can be applied to resolve the address mapping
challenge.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we discuss in detail the DRAM device-level address mapping challenges
when selective error protection scheme is applied. To resolve the challenges, the CRM based
and Section based address mapping schemes are proposed. The proposed mapping schemes are
flexible and can be selectively applied to either maintain high memory locality or high accessing
parallelism by tuning the proposed adjustment factors. All these schemes are based on modulo
operation, which is proved to be efficient. The proposed schemes can be applied to diverse
scenarios balancing power and area overhead with reliability requirement. They are efficient,
flexible and feasible in practice.
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CHAPTER 5. FREE ECC: EFFICIENT ECC DESIGN FOR
COMPRESSED LLC
Cache compression schemes have been proposed to increase the effective cache capacity of
last-level cache, for which we found the conventional cache ECC design is inefficient. In this
chapter, we propose Free ECC that utilizes the unused fragments in compressed cache design to
store ECC. It not only reduces the chip overhead but also improves cache utilization and power
efficiency. Additionally, we propose an efficient convergent cache allocation scheme to organize
the compressed data blocks more effectively than existing schemes. Our evaluation using SPEC
CPU2006 and PARSEC benchmarks shows that the Free ECC design improves cache capacity
utilization and power efficiency significantly, with negligible overhead on overall performance.
This new design makes compressed cache an increasingly viable choice for processors with
requirements of high reliability.
5.1 Introduction
Recently, efficient compression techniques have been proposed [17, 109, 3, 80] for on-chip
caches to increase the effective capacity without physically enlarging the storage. Typically,
compressed cache doubles the number of tag fields and merely targets a 2x cache capacity. This
parameter is selected mainly due to the limitation of average compression ratio viable, while
avoiding unnecessary tag arrays on chip. Therefore, all of our following discussions use this 2x
compressed cache as the baseline. Compression techniques save the real estate of data array
when being compared with conventional method, which increases cache capacity by brute force.
Thus, the number of on-chip transistors is effectively reduced and so is the leakage power.
However, the conventional cache ECC design is inefficient when used in compressed caches.
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We formulate this efficiency as cache capacity utilization using the following formula:
e =
Combined Size of Effective Data Blocks
Physical Cache Capacity
Without error protection, this factor is 2 in maximum for a compressed cache that targets
2x compression [109, 80]. The maximum utilization reduces to 1.78 if conventional ECC design
is used. We have observed that, in recently proposed compressed cache schemes, a compressed
cache has a significant amount of unused fragments in the cache data blocks as the result
of compression. If done properly, those fragments can be utilized to store ECC. It not only
reduces chip cost but also improves cache capacity utilization and power efficiency. It will not
be straightforward, though, because the unused fragments are of variable sizes and they may
not always be available for a given cache block.
In this chapter, we propose a design called Free ECC to embed ECC into the unused
fragments in compressed caches to avoid dedicated ECC storage. The design is tightly coupled
with the cache compression scheme. For a given cache block, there are three cases of embedding
its ECC, which is distinguished by a compression encoding field of the block (the field exists in
compressed cache and uniquely identifies a compression pattern). First, the ECC can be stored
directly in the unused fragment if the fragment is large enough to hold the ECC, which is a
common case. Second, if the fragment is not large enough, a lightweight EDC (Error Detecting
Code) is embedded into the block, and the ECC is stored in a reserved block of the same cache
set of the cache block. For a cache read, the ECC is accessed only if an error is detected by
EDC checking, which is a rare case. In other words, almost all cache reads only incur accessing
a single cache block, even if the ECC is stored in another block. The remaining space of the
reserved block will be still used for data storage. We have revised the compressed cache scheme
such that, for any compression pattern, if a cache block is compressed, the unused fragment is
always large enough to embed the EDC. Finally, for a cache block that cannot be compressed,
its EDC is maintained in the compression encoding field, which is not used when the block
stores uncompressed data.
We have carefully examined the technical issues and challenges in Free ECC design and
have resolved those issues with minimal impact on system performance. We also propose a
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d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7
Original 64 bytes data
Shortened storage length is 24 bytes
Δ0 Δ1 Δ2 Δ3 Δ4 Δ5 Δ6 Δ7
All are two-byte sign-extension wordΔs
d0 Δ0 Δ1 Δ2 Δ3 Δ4 Δ5 Δ6 Δ7
Figure 5.1: An example of B∆I (B8∆2) compression algorithm, in which base size is eight bytes
and each ∆ is two bytes.
convergent cache allocation scheme to efficiently organize compressed data blocks in a set. It
provides improved compression ratio or reduced complexity when compared with two existing
cache compression schemes.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 introduces the background
of cache compression schemes and related work. Free ECC Cache design is presented in Sec-
tion 5.3. Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 present simulation environment and analyze the simulation
results, respectively. Section 5.6 concludes this chapter.
5.2 Background and Related Work
5.2.1 Cache Compression Schemes
Compression algorithms have been widely studied [80, 109, 3, 122, 123, 18] for decades.
However, only those with simple and fast hardware implementations can be used in cache com-
pression. Among existing compression algorithms, ZCA (Zero-Content Augmented Cache) [17],
FVC (Frequent Value Compression) [109], FPC (Frequent Pattern Compression) [3] and re-
cently proposed B∆I (Base-Delta-Immediate compression) [80] are potential selections for cache
compression due to the hardware simplicity. ZCA [17] focuses on reducing the storage of zero
value in cache as it is frequent. FVC [109] based compression observes that a certain number
of values are frequent and could be represented by smaller length of encoding bits. FPC [3] is
proposed to compress data with certain patterns like zero runs, sign-extension, half-word and
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others. It is built on the observation that some data patterns are frequent and representable
by fewer bits.
In Free ECC design, we opt for B∆I as the baseline compression algorithm due to its
competitive compression ratio and low decompression latency. However, all the discussions
can be extended to most of the other algorithms. B∆I [80] explores the similarity of nearby
data segments in a data block. It represents data with a base (B) and a set of differences
(∆s) between data segments and the selected base. Figure 5.1 presents an example of the
compression scheme. In the example, the 64-byte data is represented in eight 8-byte seg-
ments {d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7}. d0 is selected as the base and differences are calculated as
∆i = di − d0 for i = 0, 1, · · · , 7. As all the ∆is (i = 0, 1, · · · , 7) are two-byte sign extension
words, the ∆s can be represented in two bytes and the 64-byte data is thus compressed to
{d0,∆0,∆1, · · · ,∆7}.
As B and ∆ sizes vary, the compressed data is thus represented as Bx∆y[I], meaning the
base size is x-byte and each ∆ is y-byte. An optional I determines whether zero is selected as
the second base, in which case a data mask is required to indicate whether ∆ is based on the
non-zero or zero base. The compressed data size thus can be calculated by x + y · (64/x)+ I
·(64/x)/8, I is 1 if zero is opted as a second base, 0 otherwise. In addition, a four-bit encoding
is required to decompress the 15 compression patterns, including uncompressed data, as a
combination of x, y and I.
5.2.2 Fragments In Compressed Cache
The cache organization maintains a tag field for each data block as an identifier. Therefore,
the number of tags determines the maximum data blocks that can be placed in the data entries.
As the compression ratio for each application varies, it is highly possible that small storage
fragments are left idle in compressed cache. Take B∆I compression algorithm as an example,
if the two compressed data lengths are 16 and 36 in one data block, a 12-byte fragment is left
unused.
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5.2.3 Related Work
Prior works [50, 118, 51, 112, 111] have studied cache error protection for uncompressed
caches. Kim and Somani [50] propose to only protect the most frequently accessed data as they
would propagate errors to other components more easily. The proposed parity caching, shadow
checking and selective checking significantly reduce the cost required for the reliability concern.
However, errors in the less frequently used data would potentially tamper other components.
ICR (In-cache replication) [118] proposes a non-uniform reliability scheme to use the existing
cache space to hold replicas of data that would be used in near future. It reduces the area
cost significantly. However, the system potentially suffers high error rate since not all cache
lines are protected. Kim [51] proposes another area efficient scheme that applies ECC to dirty
blocks and EDC to clean blocks and it periodically evicts dirty blocks to DRAM to reduce the
amount of ECC required in cache. However, this scheme increases the traffic to main memory.
The most recent studies propose to decouple error detection and error correction to mini-
mize the overhead in tolerating errors [112, 111]. They propose to keep the light-weight EDC
in on-chip cache while oﬄoading the high-cost ECC code to remote off-chip DRAMs given the
observation that error correction is a rare event. Such a separation of EDC and ECC signifi-
cantly reduces the cost of the dedicated storage for redundancy but does not eliminate it, and
it introduces the overhead for updating and retrieving ECC from/to DRAMs. In the case that
a dirty cache line is updated and its ECC is not cached, a DRAM accessing is required to
update the corresponding ECC. A continuous writing to the same dirty line would worsen the
situation. Although they further propose ECC FIFO [111] to reduce overhead for accessing
main memory for ECC, the scheme will still potentially increase main memory traffic and its
power consumption. There are also many other studies [58, 117, 116] proposed to reduce the
overhead of reliable cache designs. However, they are not targeting the specific compressed
cache schemes and do not explore the fragments in compressed caches.
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(a) A conventional uncompressed 4-way set associative cache organization
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Compress encoding code
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(b) A B∆I compressed cache organization with double tag fields to maintain 2x data in data storage
Figure 5.2: Comparison of uncompressed cache and compressed cache organizations.
5.3 Design of Free ECC
In this section, we first present the compressed cache organization and the proposed conver-
gent allocation scheme. Based on this layout, we discuss in detail the challenges and strategies
adopted in Free ECC cache implementation.
5.3.1 Convergent Allocation Scheme
Figure 5.2 compares the compressed cache organization with its uncompressed form. Fig-
ure 5.2a presents the uncompressed four-way set associative cache. Compared with the uncom-
pressed form, Figure 5.2b doubles the number of tag fields to allow two data blocks to reside
in one cache block. Applying B∆I compression algorithm, a 4-bit encoding C is attached to
each tag to help decode and address the two data blocks in one cache line as illustrated in Sec-
tion 5.2. Compared with Figure 5.2a, Figure 5.2b virtually doubles the cache capacity without
physically enlarging the data storage.
In compressed caches, the layout of data blocks affects compression ratio and thus the
performance. Figure 5.3 compares the uncompressed and three compressed cache allocation
schemes. Figure 5.3a presents the eight data blocks in one set for an eight-way set associative
cache. Figure 5.3b presents an example of consecutive allocation layout, which allocates space
for compressed data blocks continuously in order to efficiently use the storage. However, this
scheme is impractical due to multiple issues. First, the compressed data can cross two cache
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of cache allocation schemes for an example eight-way set associative
cache. The dark gray fields are fragments left unused.
blocks, i.e. data C6, C9 and C14. This non-alignment complicates cache read access. Second,
as the length of compressed data varies, the address of a data block in one set changes dynam-
ically, which complicates the addressing. The calculation of starting position of a data block
requires the information of compressed lengths of all the prior data blocks. Most importantly,
it introduces data movement issue caused by data overflow, also called fat write for the case
that the coming data cannot fit in its prior slot. In such cases, all the following data requires
to move backwards. These excessive overheads hamper its adoption in on-chip caches though
such allocation scheme uses cache capacity efficiently.
Conventionally, fixed-space allocation is applied to organize the data placement. An ex-
ample layout is shown in Figure 5.3c. In such a scheme, every 64-byte block is regarded as
two 32-byte storage. If compressed data can fit into a 32-byte block, it uses half of the entry.
Otherwise, it uses the entire 64-byte cache block. For example, compressed data blocks C3
and C4 are placed in one entry as their sizes are both less than 32 bytes. However, data C9
is greater than 32 bytes and thus occupies the entire cache block. In the case of a fat write,
the data block that shares the same cache block with the coming data is simply evicted. It
thus eliminates the data movement issue and simplifies addressing data blocks. Such a simple
scheme addresses the issues in consecutive allocation with penalty of compression ratio loss.
We propose convergent cache allocation to improve the compression ratio of fixed-space
allocation. Figure 5.3d presents an example data layout. It allows two compressed data to
place in one entry if the total size fits into one block. The two compressed data are placed
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from the two ends of the entry and leave the fragment in the middle. It has the following
advantages. First, it increases the compression ratio compared with fixed-space allocation. For
example, data C9 and C10 are placed in one entry in Figure 5.3d while they reside in two blocks
in Figure 5.3c. Second, it shares all the advantages of fixed-space allocation, i.e. eliminating
data movement issue and simplifying data blocks addressing. In addition, the placement of
two compressed data leaves one big fragment in the middle instead of two smaller ones in
fixed-space allocation, which helps maintain ECC.
The details of cache access for convergent allocation are similar to that of fixed-space cache
allocation. In fixed-space cache allocation, the start position of the second compressed data is
always fixed to the half point of block size. It ends at multiple varied positions depending on
compressed data lengths. For convergent cache allocation, the start position of second data in a
block varies but it always ends at the last byte of the block. With B∆I compression algorithm,
the start position of the second compressed data is the two’s complement of the corresponding
compressed data length. For example, given a compressed data length of 16, the start position
is 110000bin which is two’s complement of the corresponding compressed data length 010000bin.
5.3.2 Free ECC Design
Based on the proposed convergent allocation scheme, we first examine a straightforward
implementation of embedding ECC into fragments. In the straightforward design, an ECC
code word is maintained for all the data blocks resided in the cache block entry. In the case
that a cache block is short of space for ECC code word, the overflowed ECC is maintained in
any other fragment in that cache set.
Such a design introduces several issues. Taking Figure 5.2b as an example, when a write
request updates data 0 in set 1 in the figure, it incurs an extra read operation to retrieve data
1 for updating ECC. Second, ECC may cause overflow in compressed caches. For example,
if there is no sufficient space to maintain ECC in way 2 set 1 in Figure 5.2b, its ECC needs
to store in another place. This introduces overhead of pointers for locating ECC and requires
extra read operation for retrieving ECC. Moreover, write overflow induced ECC movement
issue. Assume the ECC code word ECC 2 for way 2 is placed in way 0 as way 2 lacks space in
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Group Methods Encoding lcps lopt Form A (x+ z) Form B (x+ y + z)
small
Zero-run 0000 0 0 0 + 0 0 + 0 + 0
Repeat 0001 8 8 8 + 1 8 + 0 + 1
B8∆1 0010 16 15 15 +2 15 + 0 + 2
B8∆1I 0011 17 16 16 +2 16 + 0 + 2
B4∆1 0100 20 19 19 + 3 19 + 0 + 3
medium
B4∆1I 0101 22 21 21 + 3 21 + 1 + 0
B8∆2 0110 24 22 22 + 3 22 + 1 + 0
B8∆2I 0111 25 23 23 + 3 23 + 1 + 0
large
B2∆1 1000 34 33 33 + 5 33 + 1 + 1
B4∆2 1001 36 34 34 + 5 34 + 1 + 1
B4∆2I 1010 38 36 36 + 5 36 + 1 + 1
B2∆1I 1011 38 37 37 + 5 37 + 1 + 1
B8∆4 1100 40 36 36 + 5 36 + 1 + 1
B8∆4I 1101 41 37 37 + 5 37 + 1 + 1
Uncompressed 1111 64 64 64 + 0 64 + 1 + 0
Table 5.1: Tailored B∆I algorithm with ECC/EDC integrated. lcps and lopt are original and
optimized compressed data lengths, respectively. Columns six and seven show the two possible
store forms of the compressed pattern. x: compressed data length; y: EDC bytes stored with
the data, z: ECC bytes stored with the data.
Figure 5.2b. In the case that data 0 overflows, ECC 2 would move to another space as fragment
in way 0 runs out. This causes extra read and write operations.
Objectives in Designing Free ECC. The design of Free ECC is to resolve those chal-
lenges and make it simple and effective. We thus have the following design objectives:
• Avoiding the extra read operation when updating ECC.
• Avoiding the second read operation to fetch ECC.
• Eliminating the ECC movement issue induced by fat write.
• Minimizing the impact to compression ratio when ECC is integrated.
In order to meet our design goals, we first optimize the B∆I compression algorithm and
then propose three strategies to simplify Free ECC design.
Optimization of B∆I. In B∆I compression algorithm, the first non-zero based ∆ is always
zero because the first non-zero data segment is selected as the base. Therefore, the first ∆ can
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be removed to shorten the compressed data length. The detailed optimization is described in
Column five (lopt) in Table 5.1. The optimization guarantees that there is at least a four-byte
fragment left unused for any two compressed data blocks maintained in one cache entry. In the
worst case, the two compressed data block lengths are 23 and 37.
Strategy to separate ECC for each data block. In order to resolve the first challenge,
we propose to separate ECC for each data block instead of applying ECC for the entire 64-byte
cache block. Using conventional SECDED (72,64) coding, we may need to pad zeros for a
data block to make it eight-byte aligned. For example, 5-byte zeros are appended following a
19-byte data block for calculating its 3-byte SECDED parity word. Therefore, no extra ECC
generating or checking logic is required for varying lengths of compressed data.
Strategy for ECC placement. In order to avoid introducing high cost of ECC pointers
and resolve ECC movement issue, we propose the following policies. First, at least one data
block’s ECC is always maintained in the same cache block if two compressed data reside in
one cache line. Therefore, only one ECC pointer is required for each cache block at most. In
the particular case that a 64-byte uncompressed data and an all-zero data block are placed
together in one entry, it still solely requires one ECC pointer. In Free ECC design, we thus add
one ECC pointer E for each cache block and an extra bit D to indicate which block’s ECC is
maintained in another cache block. This strategy introduces minimal impact to compression
ratio as we observe that for any two compressed data that can reside in one block, there is at
least four-byte fragment left in B∆I algorithm.
Second, the overflowed ECC is stored in the last cache block in that set instead of any
arbitrary fragment in cache to avoid ECC movement issue and simplify ECC locating. The
reserved ECC space is regarded as 16 four-byte segments, which means E is four bits. In the
worst case that all data are uncompressed, 56 bytes of storage is reserved in the last entry for
ECC for an eight-way set associative cache. We therefore leave the first eight bytes in the last
cache block for data and E = 0000 is an invalid ECC pointer, which means all the ECCs are
maintained in the same block for that cache line.
Strategy for data protection. In the case that there is no sufficient space to maintain
ECC in the same block, an extra cache access is required to fetch its ECC. In order to avoid the
73
set0
set1
setN
tag0
data0
C
E
4 bytes segments
EDC4 ECC1 ECC2 ECC3D
0 0000 0 0 1111 1
E DS S
data1 data4 data2 data3
tag1 tag7 way0 way1
EDC3
1 1101 0
E DS ECC4ECC0
C
Figure 5.4: Free ECC cache organization.
second access, we bind one byte EDC for such data block. The computing of EDC is similar
to that of ECC such that the data is aligned by padding zeros. With the adoption of this
strategy, the second cache access is only required if an error is detected, which is a rare event.
The integrating of EDC introduces negligible impact on compression ratio as we observe that
there is one byte space left in almost all cases if the data is compressible.
For the particular case that data is uncompressible, we place its one-byte EDC into the two
4-bit encoding C fields. The design is reasonable as in this case the encoding bits are unused.
An extra special bit S is thus required to identify this case. If S is set, the two C fields store
the one-byte EDC for an uncompressed data. Tag of the data is selected by checking D bit as
no ECC is needed for the other possible data zero.
Optimization for compression ratio. In the above design, all data blocks in cache
are protected by ECC. Such a scheme can introduce penalty to cache compression ratio. We
thus propose an optimized protection scheme to reduce the cost. In the optimization, clean
data blocks are not protected by ECC based on the observation that their duplications exist in
DRAM system. In case that EDC detects an error, the dependable duplication can be retrieved
from lower level main memory. Therefore, a clean data block merely requires one-byte EDC
code and thus mitigates the costs introduced by Free ECC design. Such an optimization causes
no extra complexity to hardware implementation. Once cache write logic recognizes a clean
block, it simply calculates an EDC byte and writes it together with data. For uncompressed
block, its EDC is still maintained in the two tag fields.
Free ECC Cache Organization. Figure 5.4 presents Free ECC cache organization by
applying all those optimization and strategies. It is similar to conventional compressed cache
illustrated in Figure 5.2b with a slight extension of tag field. A four-bit ECC pointer E and
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Figure 5.6: Free ECC cache write operation.
a one-bit D are appended to locate the overflowed ECC; and a one-bit S is added to tell if
EDC is stored in the two encoding fields. As described in Figure 5.4, E and D fields for way
0 set 1 are 0000 and 0 in binary, respectively, which means ECC 0 and ECC 1 are stored in
the same block with data 0 and data 1. As for way 1, its S bit is set to 1 and D is 0. This
means an uncompressed data block is stored in way 1 and its tag is tag 2. If tag 3 is valid,
its corresponding data is zero. For the uncompressed data, its EDC is maintained in the two
encoding C fields and its ECC is stored at the 13th (1101 in binary) segment in the last cache
block in that set. The S, E and D for way 2 are 0, 15 and 1, which indicates that EDC of
data 3 is embedded together with the data and its ECC is stored in the 15th segment in the
last cache block. Since D points to data 3, it implicates that ECC 2 for data 2 is maintained
following data 2.
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Free ECC Read Operation. Free ECC cache read operation is similar to conventional
compressed cache access as illustrated in Figure 5.5. After tag matching, the corresponding S
and E bits are examined and D bit is checked. If E is unset, all the ECCs are stored following
the data. Otherwise, the EDC of D pointed data resides in the block or in C field if S is
set. Then one cache access is executed and either ECC or EDC and the compressed data are
fetched. The data decompression and error detection and correction are operated in parallel.
In a rare case that EDC detects an error but cannot correct it, a second cache access is required
to fetch its ECC located by ECC pointer E. Given the fact that cache error is a rare event,
(i.e. 10−3 FIT/bit), the case that two cache accesses are required for one cache read request is
negligible.
Free ECC Write Operation. Figure 5.6 illustrates the Free ECC cache write operation.
When a tag matches, the compressed data is placed to the cache block. In the case of a fat
write, LRU replacement is activated to select a proper position for the coming data. During the
operation, an eviction may be necessary since there is no sufficient space to hold that data. The
detailed replacement policy adopted is presented in Algorithm 1 in Section 5.5. If a position is
selected for the coming data, its ECC or EDC is selectively written into the same entry based
on the compressed data length and ECC pointer E.
We divide B∆I encodings into three groups to simplify the design. Group Gsmall are data
whose compressed lengths are less than 20 bytes and Glarge are data with compressed lengths
greater than 23 bytes. Group Gmedium are those with lengths in between the two.
Gsmall : {lopt | lopt ≤ 19}
Gmedium : {lopt | 19 < lopt ≤ 23}
Glarge : {lopt | 23 < lopt ≤ 37}
The partition of the compressed lengths into three group simplifies cache hardware implemen-
tation. In order to write the coming data block, the extended tag fields are fetched to check
the current cache status. Table 5.2 presents the detailed combinations for writing the coming
data blocks in a cache. If the two compressed data reside in one cache line and any of them
is from Gsmall or no one is from Glarge, both ECCs are placed in the same entry. If the two
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Existing data form Coming data Write form
small ECC X data + ECC
X X small data + ECC
X EDC X data + ECC
medium ECC
medium data + ECC
large data + EDC + 1-byte ECC
large ECC medium data + EDC
Table 5.2: Hardware implementation truth table. X means any case. The existing and coming
data are the two possible data in one cache block in a 2x compressed cache.
compressed data are from Gmedium and Glarge, one data’s ECC is placed in the reserved last
cache block depending on E bits. In the case that five-byte ECC is required to store in the
reserved block, we keep one-byte of the ECC in the data block and only maintain the other
four bytes in reserved entry to align the four-byte segment.
Table 5.1 also contains the details of different combinations. In the table, form A and form
B are two possible writing forms for a particular compressed data pattern in the worst case.
For example, data from group Gsmall will always writes its ECC together with itself. In the
most common cases, data from groups Gmedium and Glarge will be written together with their
ECCs. However, in the worst case where there is no sufficient fragment left, a one-byte EDC
is maintained following the data from Gmedium. For data from Glarge, the first byte of its ECC
and its one-byte EDC will be maintained together with data block. This guarantees that the
remaining ECC code word is exactly four bytes, which uses one segment in the last cache entry
in that set.
We implement the control logic with verilog HDL to calculate write location and update
status bits based on current cache status. The circuit is designed following the truth Table 5.2
and synthesized by Cadence RTL compiler with 65nm TSMC library. In total, the circuit
solely costs tens of standard cells and the power consumption is negligible. In the case that
the coming data is uncompressed, the special bit S is set and its EDC byte stores in the two C
fields. The ECC pointer E is updated to point to its ECC location. The status bits E, D and
S are updated correspondingly during ECC write to facilitate cache read request in future.
77
Parameter Value
Processor 1 or 4 ooo cores, 4GHz, 14-stage pipeline
Functional units 2 IntALU, 4 LSU, 2 FPALU
IQ, ROB and LSQ IQ 32, ROB 128, LQ 48, SQ 44
Physical registers 128 Int, 128 FP, 128 BR, 128 ST
L1 caches (per core) 64KB Inst/64KB Data, 2-way, 16B line, hit latnecy: 3-cycle Inst,
3-cycle Data
L2 cache (shared) 0.5∼8MB, 8-way, 64B line, 14-cycle latency for 2MB cache
Memory 200 cycles latency
Table 5.3: Major simulation parameters.
5.4 Experimental Methodologies
We use a cycle accurate full system simulator Marss-x86 [78], which is for x86-64 architec-
ture. Both single- and four-core out-of-order configurations are simulated with a two-level cache
hierarchy. To evaluate the compression ratio of the proposed convergent allocation scheme, we
configure L2 cache with 64-byte block size with capacity varying from 512KB to 8MB. All the
27 compilable benchmarks from 29 SPEC CPU2006 suite [98] and 11 out of 13 PARSEC [8]
benchmarks are simulated. We create checkpoints for Marss simulator after initialization. After
a warm-up period, we sample the compression ratio every 100 million cycles for the following
500 million instructions. Table 5.3 shows the major parameters for the simulation platform.
For quad-core system simulation, we fix the L2 cache to 8-way 2MB capacity. The cache
LRU replacement policy is optimized to improve the compression ratio and system performance.
The detailed optimization is illustrated in Algorithm 1 in Section 5.5.
We construct four-core workloads based on their cache capacity sensitivity and compression
ratio following study [80]. The detailed workloads are presented in Table 5.4. The system
performance is characterized using SMT weighted speedup [96]
∑n
i
IPCmulti[i]
IPCsingle[i]
, where n is the
total number of applications running, IPCmulti[i] and IPCsingle[i] are IPC values of application
i running under multi-core and single-core environment, respectively.
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Workload Applications
C4S4 soplex, astar, hmmer, bzip2
C4S3 soplex, hmmer, xalancbmk, h264ref
C4S0 libquantum, gobmk, tonto, namd
C4S2 calculix, gamess, gromacs, leslie3d
C0S1 mcf, lbm, milc, sjeng
C4S3 soplex, astar, hmmer, libquantum
C3S4 bzip2, xalancbmk, h264ref, calculix
C4S1 soplex, libquantum, gobmk, tonto
C4S1 hmmer, namd, calculix, gamess
C1S1 soplex, mcf, lbm, milc
C1S1 hmmer, lbm, milc, sjeng
C0S4 sphinx3, perlbench, omnetpp, gcc
C2S4 sphinx3, omnetpp, soplex, astar
C2S4 perlbench, gcc, hmmer, h264ref
Table 5.4: Workload construction. C: compression ratio, S: sensitivity. Compression ratio is
evaluated using 2MB 8-way L2 cache and sensitivity is examined with L2 cache size varying
from 512KB to 8MB. CmSn consists of m benchmarks with high compression ratio and n
benchmarks with high cache capacity sensitivity.
5.5 Experimental Results
5.5.1 Comparison of Cache Allocation Schemes
In the simulation of the three cache allocation schemes, we first optimize cache replacement
policy based on LRU, as we observed that cache compression introduces extra replacement
due to fat write. For example, in a straightforward replacement policy in fixed-space and
convergent allocations, a fat write to DataA will introduce replacement of its neighbor, marked
as DataB. However, this will introduce thrashing if DataB is required next. Therefore, we
make the following optimization for a fat write. The policy is shown in Algorithm 1.
In the algorithm, it first searches if coming data block is suitable to any invalid cache block
before applying LRU algorithm directly. If so, the coming data block uses the invalid entry.
This optimization can improve compression ratio and avoid thrashing. In previous example,
DataA is a fat write to DataB and will introduce eviction to DataB. After optimization, DataA
is placed in another invalid entry and DataB is thus saved in cache.
Compression Ratio. Figure 5.7 presents cache compression ratio applying the three dif-
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Algorithm 1 Cache replacement policy based on LRU
while (Cache set scan not finished) do
if (find an invalidated way in set) then
if (data fit into way) then
write to the way and return
end if
end if
end while
while (Cache set scan not finished) do
if (find a way using LRU) then
if (data fit into way) then
write to the way and return
end if
end if
end while
if (fixed-space or convergent allocation) then
evict its neighbor
write data and return
end if
if (consecutive allocation) then
evict multiple blocks till data fit
write data and return
end if
ferent allocation schemes based on the optimized replacement policy. Compression ratio is
defined as the compressed cache capacity over uncompressed cache size and is normalized to
fixed-space allocation. Figure 5.7a shows the compression ratio for SPEC benchmarks of a 2MB
cache in detail. On average, the proposed convergent allocation improves the compression ratio
by 15.0% with 40.9% in maximum. The reason for the improvement is illustrated in Figure 5.3.
By applying B∆I compression algorithm in our simulation, the compressed data length can
be greater than half of cache block size, which is 32 bytes. Therefore, two data blocks may
not maintain in one cache entry by fixed-space allocation but by convergent allocation scheme.
Figure 5.7b presents the averages of SPEC and PARSEC benchmarks for caches varying from
512KB to 8MB. On average, convergent allocation improves the compression ratio by 12.6%,
13.3%, 15.0%, 16.0%, 15.8% for SPEC benchmarks of those cache sizes, respectively. The im-
provements for PARSEC benchmarks are 13.2%, 14.2%, 18.9%, 24.0% and 22.1%, respectively.
For same compressed data length, an efficient placement policy can improve cache capacity
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(a) Detailed compression ratio comparison for a 2MB cache for SPEC benchmarks.
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Figure 5.7: Comparison of cache compression ratio for three cache allocation schemes for both
SPEC and PARSEC benchmarks. The legend and y-axis for right figure is not presented to
save space and it is the same to left figure.
utilization.
When compared with consecutive allocation, the results are interesting. For some bench-
marks, the proposed convergent allocation performs higher compression ratio than consecutive
allocation. The possible reason is that a fat write may evict multiple data blocks in our opti-
mized cache LRU replacement policy as illustrated in Algorithm 1. This reduces the number
of effective data blocks in the cache, but may benefit the system performance. We thus did a
profiling simulation that compares cache compression ratio for the same data placed in cache
using the three allocation schemes. In profiling simulation, cache is physically configured to 2x
capacity. We sample the 2x data and virtually place them in a 1x sized compressed cache using
those allocation schemes. Note that 1x sized compressed cache targets 2x capacity depends on
compression ratio. It therefore shows the layout impact to compression ratio.
Figure 5.8 presents the results. Figure 5.8a compares the profiled compression ratio for
SPEC benchmarks. The benchmark names are represented by the first three characters to
make the figure readable. Part of the combinations of benchmarks and cache capacity con-
figurations are not presented as that large cache is not fully utilized. It is obvious that our
proposed convergent allocation scheme improves cache compression ratio compared to fixed-
space allocation. The maximum improvement is 30.8% for gamess benchmark for 1M cache
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of cache compression ratio for three cache allocation schemes for varied
cache capacities. Due to space limit, part of the benchmarks are represented by its first three
characters. Large cache sizes for which benchmarks cannot fully utilize are not presented.
capacity. On average, convergent allocation scheme improves compression ratio by 7.3%, 8.9%,
8.5%, 6.8%, 4.9% and 3.5% for 512KB, 1MB, 2MB, 4MB, 8MB and 16MB cache capacities re-
spectively, compared to fixed-space allocation. When being compared to the ideal compression
ratio of consecutive allocation, it is 3.6%, 3.4%, 3.8%, 3.7%, 2.7% and 2.7% lower for those
cache capacities, respectively. Figure 5.8b presents the comparison for PARSEC benchmarks
and it shows the same trend. On average, convergent allocation improves compression ratio by
10.8%, 9.3%, 9.7%, 10.5% and 13.3% for the varied cache capacities respectively, compared to
fix-space allocation. The differences are merely 2.1%, 2.2%, 2.6%, 2.7% and 3.5% compared to
consecutive allocation scheme for these cache capacities, respectively.
System Performance. Figure 5.9 illustrates the performance comparison of the three
allocation schemes for single- and four- core systems. Benchmarks not presented here are in-
sensitive to cache capacity. The left part of Figure 5.9a shows system performance comparison
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Figure 5.9: Single- and four- core system performance comparison of three cache allocation
schemes.
for a 2M L2 cache in detail and the right part presents the average results for varied cache
capacities. All the IPCs are normalized to fixed-space allocation scheme. On average, there
is 1∼2% improvement for convergent allocation compared to fixed-space allocation. The im-
provement comes from the increased cache capacity from compressing. Note that consecutive
allocation performs better than convergent allocation in almost all cases in the simulation al-
though its compression ratio can be lower than convergent allocation as shown in Figure 5.7.
This presents the fact that both cache capacity and the importance of data blocks maintained
in cache affect system performance. Figure 5.9b presents performance results for four-core
system with 2M LLC. All data are normalized to fixed-space allocation. On average, conver-
gent allocation improves system performance by 1∼2% and higher improvement comes from
capacity-sensitive workloads.
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(a) Compressed data patterns in a 16-way set associative, 2M L2 cache. Groups
are defined following Table 5.1.
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(b) Mathematical probability for combinations of two compressed patterns.
Figure 5.10: Compressed data patterns rate and probability of various combinations. “LL”:
both data blocks are from group large; “ML”: two data blocks are from group medium and
group large; “S”: at least one data is from group small or both data blocks are from group
medium. In combination “S”, there is sufficient fragment in the same cache entry to place
ECC.
5.5.2 B∆I Data Compressed Pattern Analysis
We analyze B∆I data compression patterns before presenting the details of Free ECC re-
sults. Figure 5.10a presents the ratio of different compression patterns in B∆I compression
algorithm for real data in L2 cache. We group those patterns into three groups following the
definition in Section 5.3.2. It is obvious that group Gsmall occupies a large portion across the
three groups for most benchmarks. It is as high as 100% for a few benchmarks, i.e. libquantum
and gemsFDTD. On average, the ratios are 80.5%, 7.3% and 12.3% for small, medium and
large groups respectively for SPEC benchmarks. Those results are 97.2%, 1.0% and 1.8% for
PARSEC benchmarks. The higher rate for small and medium group means higher probability
that fragments left in cache is sufficient for ECC.
In Table 5.2, we analyze the writing forms for coming data blocks. As long as one of
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(a) Effective cache utilization comparison of conventional ECC and un-
optimized Free ECC design for SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks on 2MB
L2 cache.
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Figure 5.11: Comparison of effective cache capacity utilization of conventional ECC, optimized
Free ECC and Free ECC cache design.
the two data blocks is from group small or both data are from group medium, there is suffi-
cient fragment left in the same data entry to maintain ECC. We thus mathematically analyze
the probability that ECC can be maintained in fragment based on the patterns ratio in Fig-
ure 5.10a. Figure 5.10b shows the mathematical deduction results. In the figure, “S” represents
a combination that at least one data is from group small or both data are from group medium.
“ML” means the two data are from group medium and large. “LL” means both data are from
group large. Note that case “LL” is impractical in reality. It is obvious that for most of the
compressed data, there is sufficient fragment left in the same data entry to maintain ECC. In
such cases, the proposed Free ECC design thus introduces no penalty to compression ratio as
ECCs are placed in otherwise unused fragments following the data and no reservation space
in last cache entry is required. The average probability of such cases is as high as 91.6% and
99.2% for SPEC and PARSEC benchmarks, respectively by mathematical deduction. This
firmly consolidates our proposal to embed ECC into the otherwise unused fragments. The
Free ECC design can thus save extra space required for ECC and power consumption while
introduces minimal cost to compression ratio.
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5.5.3 Effective Utilization of Cache Capacity
Figure 5.11 shows the comparison of effective cache capacity utilization for compressed
cache with conventional ECC and Free ECC cache design. As illustrated in the figure, the
compression ratio is reduced slightly by 3.0%, 3.6%, 4.4%, 3.6%, 3.0% and 1.7% for 256KB,
512KB, 1MB, 2MB, 4MB and 8MB caches, respectively for SPEC benchmarks. Those values
are 3.2%, 4.1% 4.5%, 5.5%, 4.8% and 3.3% for PARSEC benchmarks. Although Free ECC
cache reduces compression ratio, it still gains in effective capacity utilization as conventional
ECC has a 12.5% overhead for ECC storage. On average, the gains are 9.0%, 8.2%, 7.6%,
8.3%, 8.9%, and 10.5% for those cache capacities for SPEC benchmarks, respectively. Those
improvements are 8.9%, 7.9%, 7.4%, 6.4%, 7.1% and 8.8% for PARSEC benchmarks. With
higher compression ratio, the improvement of effective utilization is potentially higher and the
highest improvement is 0.22 in theory, which is gained by several benchmarks, e.g. zeusmp,
povray, and gemsFDTD. For a few benchmarks that can not hold ECC in fragments efficiently,
there is slight loss in utilization. For example, the loss is 1.7% for gromacs with 2MB physical
cache capacity.
With optimization that no ECC storage is required for clean data blocks, loss of compression
ratio is reduced slightly and capacity utilization is improved. The details of each benchmark are
not presented in figure to make it readable and the average results are shown in Figure 5.11b.
For some benchmarks, the improvement is as high as 0.029 (i.e. leslie3d), which means for the
2MB cache simulated, optimization can improve effective cache capacity by 60KB compared
to unoptimized Free ECC design. Although the improvement is not significant on average, it
gains without any extra cost.
We analyze the details for optimized Free ECC design. Figure 5.12 presents clean data
blocks ratio in cache. As it shows, 12 out of 27 simulated SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks have
more than 50% of clean blocks in entire cache. On average, 47.5% of data blocks are clean for the
simulated 2MB L2 cache. This provides opportunity for our proposed optimization that there
is no need to maintain ECC for clean data blocks. It therefore reduces requirement of fragments
in cache to maintain ECC and reduces the negative impact of Free ECC design. The clean
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Figure 5.12: Clean data blocks rate for SPEC and PARSEC benchmarks in a 2MB L2 cache.
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Figure 5.13: Comparison of cache performance for conventional ECC with Free ECC cache.
data block ratio for PARSEC benchmarks is higher, for which, 8 out of 11 simulated PARSEC
benchmarks have more than 60% clean data blocks in cache. On average, the clean blocks rate
is 71.3%, which explains that the proposed optimization can improve cache compression ratio
and cache capacity utilization.
5.5.4 Performance of Free ECC
Figure 5.13 illustrates the system performance comparison of Free ECC with conventional
compressed cache for single-core configuration. Figure 5.13a presents details for a 2MB physical
cache for SPEC benchmarks and Figure 5.13b shows the average performance comparison for
varied cache capacities. The optimized Free ECC cache performance is included. Both the
detailed and average performance show that the performance loss is around 1% for Free ECC
design for all cache configurations for both SPEC and PARSEC benchmarks. As most ECC
87
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
C4
S4
C4
S3
C4
S3
C4
S2
C4
S1
C4
S1
C4
S0
C3
S4
C2
S4
C2
S4
C1
S1
C1
S1
C0
S1
C0
S4
AV
G-
SP
EC
AV
G-
PA
RS
EC
Conventional ECC Free ECC
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
w
ei
gh
te
d 
SM
T 
sp
ee
du
p
Figure 5.14: Four-core system performance comparison of conventional ECC with Free ECC.
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Figure 5.15: 2MB L2 cache power consumption comparison of conventional ECC cache and
Free ECC cache design in a single-core machine. AVG-S and AVG-P mean the average of SPEC
and PARSEC benchmarks. B: baseline, F: Free ECC.
can fit into unused fragments in compressed cache, there is only small capacity loss for ECC
reservation, which affects system performance slightly. The proposed optimization improves
system performance slightly as show in Figure 5.13b. Although the improvements are minimal,
they are obtained without any cost.
Figure 5.14 presents performance of four-core configuration. The cache capacity is fixed
to 2MB in physical. Consistent with single core results, the loss is within 1% for both SPEC
and PARSEC workloads. The results show that Free ECC design efficiently uses the fragments
left in compressed cache schemes and introduces negligible impact to cache performance. The
performance for optimized Free ECC design is not presented here and it is consistent with
single core results. The improvement is slight but the gain is obtained without extra cost.
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Figure 5.16: Average L2 cache power consumption for conventional ECC and Free ECC cache
design for SPEC and PARSEC benchmarks. Cache capacity varies from 512KB to 8MB.
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Figure 5.17: 2MB L2 cache power consumption comparison of conventional ECC cache and
Free ECC cache design in a four-core system. B: baseline, F: free ECC design.
5.5.5 Cache Power Consumption
We further evaluate cache power consumption of Free ECC when compared with conven-
tional ECC design of compressed cache using CACTI 5.3 [102]. The cache is configured with
two banks and 45nm technology is applied. Figure 5.15 presents the power consumption for
2MB cache with single core configuration for SPEC benchmarks in detail. The baseline is the
conventional compressed cache with 12.5% storage overhead for ECC. For 2MB cache capacity,
the Free ECC design reduces the power consumption by 9.0% and 9.1% on average for SPEC
and PARSEC benchmarks, respectively. The maximum improvement is 11.1% for gemsFDTD
because the ratio of extra ECC write is small. As the figure shows, Free ECC cache introduces
extra ECC write which increases the write power. However, it significantly reduces the leakage
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power, which dominates the power consumption.
Figure 5.16 illustrates the average power consumption for caches varying from 512KB to
8MB. Free ECC cache reduces the consumed power by 2.7%, 5.1%, 6.9%, 9.0%, 9.3% and
10.0% for SPEC benchmarks for those caches, respectively. Those improvements are 3.1%,
5.4%, 7.3%, 9.1%, 9,4% and 9.9% for PARSEC benchmarks. As capacity grows, the leakage
power increases and Free ECC design can significantly reduce the overhead in conventional
ECC cache, thus power efficiency improves with the increase of cache size.
The detailed power consumption of optimized Free ECC design is not presented in figure as
it is consistent with performance improvement. The optimization can reduce cache write power
and leakage power slightly. As it avoids partial writing of ECC to the reserved cache entry and
improves system performance compared to Free ECC, the power consumption is thus reduced
slightly.
Figure 5.17 presents the 2MB L2 cache power consumption for four-core system. On av-
erage, Free ECC design saves power by 9.3% as it significantly reduces the leakage power.
As shown in the figure, Free ECC saves slightly more power for workloads that with higher
compression ratios. This is because the extra ECC write is less than that of workloads with
lower compression ratios. Overall, Free ECC design removes the dedicated storage of ECC in
conventional ECC cache and thus saves the power consumption of cache memories.
5.5.6 Energy-Delay Product Improvement
Figures 5.15, 5.16 and 5.17 also present the Energy-Delay Product (EDP) comparison for
conventional compressed ECC cache and Free ECC cache. Across all configurations with all
workloads, Free ECC design improves system EDP. On average, Free ECC cache improves EDP
by 1.1%, 3.2%, 4.6%, 8.4%, 8.8% and 8.8% for SPEC benchmarks for varied cache capacities
from 256KB to 8MB, respectively. Higher cache capacity presents higher EDP saving which is
consistent with the trend of power saving. Those improvements for PARSEC benchmarks are
2.2%, 3.4%, 5.1%, 8.0%, 9.4% and 9.4%, respectively. These results show that the performance
loss caused by Free ECC design is slight and its saving of power consumption offsets the
performance loss.
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5.6 Summary
We have presented a low-cost and efficient reliability scheme for compressed last-level caches.
An efficient cache allocation scheme is designed for compressed data layout and Free ECC cache
organization is proposed based on this scheme to explore the hidden error protection capability
of compressed cache. The design fits ECC/EDC into small fragments left in compressed cache
to remove the dedicated ECC storage required in conventional ECC design. It significantly
improves the effective cache capacity utilization and power efficiency, while introducing minimal
impact to system performance. The Free ECC is specific for cache compression and the design
is simple, effective and power efficient.
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CHAPTER 6. MEMGUARD: A LOW COST AND ENERGY
EFFICIENT DESIGN TO SUPPORT AND ENHANCE MEMORY
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
The conventional reliability design is to use redundant memory bits for error detection and
correction, with significant storage, cost and power overheads. In this chapter, we propose
a novel, system-level scheme called MemGuard for memory error detection. With OS-based
checkpointing, it is also able to recover program execution from memory errors. The proposed
MemGuard design is much stronger than SECDED in error detection capability and it incurs
negligible hardware cost and energy overhead, no storage overhead, and is compatible with
various memory organizations. We have comprehensively investigated and evaluated the fea-
sibility and reliability of the scheme. Our mathematical deduction and synthetic simulation
prove that MemGuard is robust and reliable.
6.1 Introduction
Main memory error protection is generally implemented with redundant information stored
in memory devices. A conventional ECC memory module uses SECDED code with a 12.5%
storage and power overhead. Chipkill Correct [15, 64] has additional capability of Single Device
Data Correction (SDDC) to tolerate multiple errors from a single chip with high power con-
sumption. Both of these designs are incompatible with non-ECC memory modules. They
also put a restriction on memory organization such that recently proposed memory sub-
ranking [105, 121, 2, 1], which improves memory energy efficiency, may not be used. The
majority of consumer-level computers, including desktop and laptop computers and mobile
devices, have not yet adopted any memory error protection scheme.
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In this chapter, we propose MemGuard, a system-level scheme with lightweight hardware
extension to support or enhance memory reliability for a wide spectrum of computer systems.
The core part of MemGuard is a low-cost and highly-effective mechanism of memory error
detection, which is revised from more complex designs of memory integrity verification [4, 99]
proposed for secure processors. By maintaining a read log hash (ReadHash) and a write log
hash (WriteHash), 128-bit each, MemGuard can detect multi-bit errors of the main memory
in very strong confidence. Conceptually, ReadHash is a hashed value of the log of all read
accesses from the main memory, and WriteHash is one for all write accesses to the main
memory. For each access, the logged data is a tuple (address, data). Periodically or at the
end of program execution, MemGuard synchronizes ReadHash and WriteHash to the same
point of execution and then matches them. A mismatch means that the result of at least one
read does not match that of the previous write to the same memory address, and therefore a
memory error must have happened.
MemGuard does not have hardware memory error correction as ECC and Chipkill Correct
do, but is much stronger in error detection. It utilizes (and relies on) an OS-based checkpointing
system for error recovery. If a memory error is detected during the execution of a given
program, the program will be rolled back to the latest checkpointed state. Since memory
error is relatively infrequent (hours for memory of gigabytes), checkpointing can be done at
a slow pace and the performance degradation from checkpointing is insignificant. MemGuard
is very useful for computers that have no other memory error protection. For consumer-level
computers in particular, MemGuard does not require any change to computer motherboards
or memory modules, the hardware cost of MemGuard itself is negligible, and its protection can
be selectively enabled for programs for which computation reliability is desired. Additionally,
MemGuard is compatible with sub-ranked memories as well as narrow-ranked memories used
in mobile devices.
MemGuard is also useful for large-scale, high-performance computing applications, in which
a single-node crash may lead to checkpoint rollback of many computing nodes. Many of those
applications already use checkpointing or redundant nodes or both, otherwise they may not
run to completion [38, 22]. With MemGuard, they do not have to run computers with ECC
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memory, which leads to reduced cost and improved energy efficiency. For computers of ECC
or Chipkill Correct memories, MemGuard can further enhance memory reliability by reducing
the probability of silent data corruption (false negative), particularly when single-bit error
correction occurs. MemGuard alone, however, may not be suitable for commercial workloads
that require both high availability and instant response, as checkpoint recovery may cause a
delay visible to end users.
MemGuard is motivated by memory integrity verification using read and write log hashes [99]
in secure processor, but the design objective and complexity are very different. In secure pro-
cessor design, the hash function must be very strong to repel carefully crafted attacks from
adversaries, and particularly it has to include a timestamp per memory block to detect replay
attacks. Significant design complexity, storage and energy overheads, and high cost can be
justified. In memory reliability design, the error pattern is random and unintentional, and
for consumer-level computers the cost has to be contained. In the design of MemGuard, we
carefully choose a simple, non-cryptographic hash function to minimize the impact on energy
efficiency and cost, and has dropped the use of timestamp. Had timestamp been used, there
would be significant storage, performance and energy efficiency overhead for modern DDRx
memories. To our best knowledge, we are the first to adopt such a scheme solely for memory
reliability in conventional computers and we comprehensively evaluate and prove its feasibility
and reliability for error protection.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 introduces background of main
memory organization variations and related work. Section 6.3 presents the details of MemGuard
design scheme. Section 6.4 describes the evaluation methodologies and the results are presented
and analyzed in Section 6.5. Finally, Section 6.6 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Background and Related Work
6.2.1 Memory Organization Variants
Various memory structures and organizations have been proposed to improve memory per-
formance or energy efficiency. In sub-ranked DRAM memories [105, 121, 2, 1], the number of
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DRAM devices in a rank is reduced so as to reduce DRAM operation power spent on precharge
and activation. However, the reduced number of devices in a rank presents a new challenge
to memory error protection as it breaks the 8:1 ratio of conventional SECDED design. The
details are presented in Section 2.4. Another type of memory structure stacks DRAM dies by
Through-Silicon Via (TSV) technology to reduce its power consumption and improve band-
width and capacity. One promising product is Hybrid Memory Cube (HMC) [34] with high
bandwidth and low power consumption and it is projected to appear in market in 2014. Such a
product drastically changes conventional DRAM organization and also presents challenges for
memory error protection. MemGuard does not put any constraints on memory organization
and thus can work with those new organizations.
6.2.2 Related Work
There have been many studies on memory system reliability [113, 114, 103, 73]. Most of
them focus on error correction for phase change memory and DRAM at memory module level.
One of the most recent studies closely related to our work is ArchShield [73]. It proposes an
architectural framework to tolerate fabrication faulty cells (hard error) induced by the extreme
scaling of DRAM. In their design, a fault map is used to record all the faulty cell locations
obtained by built-in self test. By consulting the fault map, it maintains replications of those
word in memory space for error correction. MemGuard is very different from ArchShield, and
they serve for different purposes. MemGuard targets soft and intermittent errors rather than
hard errors, and it does not have to maintain faulty cell locations.
6.3 MemGuard Design
6.3.1 Incremental Hash Functions
Incremental hash function is first proposed by Mihir Bellare et al [7] in 1990s. Such a hash
function has the property that the cost to update the result hash upon a modification to the
original message is proportional to the modification. Consider a message M and its hash value
H(M). With modifications δ to the message, the result message is denoted as M ′ = M + δ, in
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which + denotes a modification such as to replace, insert or delete a data block of the message.
Incremental hash function can update the result hash of modified message using the following
equation:
H(M ′) = H(M) +H(δ)
where = and + are equality and modification operations, respectively, for the defined hash
function. The equation means that as long as we have H(M) and H(δ), we could calculate the
result hash. There is no need to retrieve the original message information of M .
Multiset hash functions are a particular type of incremental hash function, operating on
multiset (set) [4]. A multiset is defined as a finite unordered collection of elements where the
occurrence of each element can be greater than one. If the occurrence of each element is exactly
one time, the multiset is reduced to a set. Multiset hash functions are incremental and the
result hash is independent of the ordering of the input elements. In detail, if we use ∪ to denote
the union operation of multiset, the properties of multiset can be denoted using the following
two equations:
H(M ∪ {b}) = H(M) +H H({b}) (6.1)
H({b1}) +H H({b2}) = H({b2}) +H H({b1}) (6.2)
where +H denotes defined hash addition operation. Equations (6.1) and (6.2) show the prop-
erties of additivity and commutativity, respectively, for multiset hash functions.
These two properties can be explored in main memory system to create a fingerprint of
memory accesses. In that scenario, each memory access is regarded as an item and a sequence
of memory accesses is considered as a multiset as there exists duplicated memory accesses to
same memory address. Define H({q}) = Hs(sq), where Hs is a hash function that takes input
of a string sq formed of (address, data) pair of the memory request q. The details of selecting
Hs hash function are presented in Section 6.3.4. Based on the two properties of multiset hash
function, we thus have the hash for a sequence Q of memory requests qi (i ∈ [1, N ]) below
H(Q) = Hs(sq1) +H Hs(sq2) +H · · ·+H Hs(sqN ) (6.3)
, where Q is a multiset that Q = {q1}∪{q2} · · ·∪{qN}. Following the two properties of multiset
hash functions, the result hash H(Q) is irrelevant to the ordering of the requests and it can be
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calculated incrementally by adding the hash value of coming memory request. In other words,
H(Q) represents a fingerprint of a sequence of memory requests.
The previous study [4] proposes four types of multiset hash functions: MSet-XOR-Hash,
MSet-Add-Hash, MSet-Mu-Hash and MSet-VAdd-Hash based on four different operations: bi-
nary XOR, conventional addition, multiplication and vector addition, respectively. That means
the +H can be any of these four operations to form a multiset hash function based on a strong
hash Hs. MSet-XOR-Hash, MSet-Mu-Hash and MSet-VAdd-Hash are not proper in MemGuard
design as they either merely support set collision resistance or introduce high overhead because
of operational complexity. We choose MSet-Add-Hash for being multiset collision resistant and
simple in operation. The function uses simple addition operation and outputs the lower m bits
of the sum, where m is the output length of hash function Hs.
6.3.2 Log Hash Based Error Detection
In MemGuard design, error detection is implemented by maintaining and cross-checking a
read log hash and a write log hash maintained in the memory controller. The two hashes are
denoted as ReadHash and WriteHash, respectively, which conceptually log the (address,
data) pairs of memory reads and memory writes. Here memory reads and memory writes are
different from actual reads and writes to the main memory, which will be discussed soon. At
runtime, the two hashes are updated upon memory events. Periodically and at the end of a
program execution, MemGuard synchronizes the ReadHash and the WriteHash to ensure
every memory read is logged in ReadHash and every write is logged in WriteHash. If no
error occurs, the two hash values must match to each other. The details for selecting a hash
function are discussed in Section 6.3.4.
Figure 6.1 and Algorithm 2 show the steps of updating the ReadHash and the Write-
Hash. We assume that the last-level cache is write-back and write-allocate. In the beginning,
when the OS loads the program to be executed into memory, the memory controller will log
each write of a memory block into WriteHash, i.e. to hash the pair (address, data) of the
memory block into WriteHash. A memory block is a block of memory of the cache block size.
Note that we do not assume the OS will load all memory pages of the program into memory
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Algorithm 2 MemGuard error detection algorithm
Initialization Operation
function init block (T , Address, predefined Data) {
update T .WriteHash with the hash of (Address.predefined Data)
write (predefined Data) to address (Address) in memory storage
}
————————————————————
Run-Time Operation
when there is a cache miss
function read block (T , Address) {
read the Data from Address in memory
update T .ReadHash with the hash of (Address.Data)
}
and store the block in Cache
when there is cache eviction
function write block (T , Address, Data) {
update T .WriteHash with the hash of (Address.Data)
if block is dirty then
write (Data) to address (Address) in memory storage
end if
}
————————————————————
Integrity Check Operation
function integrity check (T ) {
NewT = (0, 0)
while block covered by T
if block is not in Cache then
call read block (T , Address)
update NewT .WriteHash with the hash of (Address, Data)
end if
end while
if ReadHash == WriteHash then
there is no error
T = NewT
else
there is error detected
end if
}
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Figure 6.1: Memory operations for memory error detection.
at this time. If a memory page is loaded during program execution because of page fault, all
blocks of the faulted page will be logged into WriteHash. We assume that there is a special
DMA mode for program loading, which triggers the update of WriteHash at the memory
controller. Normal memory accesses during OS kernel execution are not logged. This step is
shown as 1© in Figure 6.1.
When the program is running, the memory controller enters a logging mode (set by the
OS). The read block operation is executed at the memory controller when a last-level cache
miss triggers a memory read. The (address, data) pair of the memory block is logged into
ReadHash, shown as 2© and 4© in Figure 6.1. If a memory block is loaded into cache for
the first time after program loading, the read will match the write to the same memory block
address at the time of program loading.
For each cache replacement (eviction), the write block operation is executed to log a
memory write in WriteHash. Note that an actual memory write happens only when the
replaced block is dirty; however, even if the replaced block is clean, the eviction is treated as
a (artificial) write and is logged in WriteHash. The purpose is to ensure the same set of
(address, data) pairs will be logged in ReadHash and WriteHash: if the evicted block is
loaded to cache again, the read will match the logged write at the time of eviction (assuming
no error happens between the eviction and the load), no matter whether an actual memory
write happened or not then. Figure 6.1 3© and 5© shows the write block operation for clean
and dirty block, respectively.
At the end of program execution or during periodical memory error checking, the integrity
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check operation is executed as shown in Figure 6.1 as 6©. For each physical memory block
used by the program, the OS checks if the block is cached or not. If it is not cached, the OS
requests the memory controller to load the memory block and log the (address, data) pair in
ReadHash. Again, this is to ensure that the same set of (address, data) pairs will be logged
in ReadHash and WriteHash: for every memory block not cached at this time, there is an
(address, data) pair that has been logged in WriteHash but not in ReadHash. This step
effectively synchronizes ReadHash and WriteHash. Then, if ReadHash and WriteHash
match, the OS determines that no memory error has happened. Otherwise, it determines an er-
ror has happened and will trigger checkpoint recovery. Note that in this step, integrity check
creates a new WriteHash and adds all the uncached blocks into the new WriteHash when
they are added to ReadHash. If no error occurred, the new WriteHash will replace the old
WriteHash and ReadHash is cleared so that a new checking period starts. In addition, we
assume that the memory controller is in a special mode, in which it does not log the normal
memory accesses from the OS. We also assume that in this mode the OS may write a memory
block address to a memory-mapped register of the memory controller to trigger an update of
ReadHash.
MemGuard does not use per-block timestamp as in the study on secure processor design [99].
The purpose of using timestamp is to prevent replay attack from an adversary, which is very
unlikely in a normal system. Assume that an error occurs in memory and changes the value of a
memory block of block address A and value X. During program loading, (A, X) will be logged
in WriteHash. When the block is loaded into cache, (A, X ′) is logged into ReadHash, which
does not match the logged write. To form an error like one from a replay attack, the program
execution may have to generate a write of (A, X ′) at a later time, and then another memory
error shall happen to change the block’s value back to X.
6.3.3 Reliability Analysis
MemGuard compares ReadHash and WriteHash to decide if a memory error occurs
in a sequence of N accesses. A hash collision happens if a memory error has happened but
ReadHash matches WriteHash. The probability of hash collision is the probability of false
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negative of memory error detection. The study of MSet-Add-Hash [4] defines that two result
hashes are equivalent if the modulus sums of the hashed values by hash function Hs are the
same. In other words, if the modulus sum of hashes for each read request is equivalent to that
of write request, there is a collision if error occurred in one or more of those accesses. Given
that the collision rate is 12m for a strong m-bit hash function and assume i out of N requests
have errors, the probability of collision is given by Formula (6.4) given that the hash result for
each access is in the range of 2m:
P (i) = (
1
2m
)i + (
1
2m
)i−1(1− 1
2m
) + · · ·+ 1
2m
(1− 1
2m
)i−1 (6.4)
Let p0, pd and pw denote the probabilities of no error, detectable error and undetectable
error in one data block for conventional error protection scheme, respectively. The probability
that i out of N accesses have error is CiN (pd+pw)
i(1−pd−pw)N−i. Combining Equation (6.4),
we thus have the collision rate for MemGuard design, represented by
FMemGuard =
N∑
i=1
P (i) · CiN (pd + pw)i(1− pd − pw)N−i (6.5)
For conventional error protection scheme, it fails as long as an undetectable error occurred to
one of the N requests. Therefore, the failure rate for conventional error protection is given by
Fconventional = 1− (1− pw)N (6.6)
Based on Formulas (6.5) and (6.6), we build a simple model to compare the error detection
capability of MemGuard design with the conventional SECDED protection. Assume the prob-
ability that any one bit error occurs to a data block with nb bits is p in a time period t. Then,
p0 = (1− p)nb denotes the probability of no error in the data block. The probability of having
an exact one-bit error is denoted as p1 = nbp(1 − p)nb−1. The probability for two-bit error is
denoted as p2 = C
2
nb
p2(1 − p)nb−2. As SECDED detects up to two-bit error, the detectable
error rate for SECDED is thus approximately1 pd = p1 + p2; and the undetectable error rate is
pw = 1− p0 − p1 − p2.
1SECDED can detect three and more bits of errors with certain probabilities. The exact probability is
evaluated by Monte Carlo simulation in Section 6.5.
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With error rate of 25,000∼70,000 FIT/Mbit from study [92], we compare failure rate
FMemGuard with Fconventional. The results are presented in Section 6.5.1.1. In general, Mem-
Guard has much higher error detection rate than SECDED in all the cases we studied. Addi-
tionally, as the time period t grows, the undetectable error rate for SECDED grows but that for
MemGuard does not increase. Furthermore, because the collision rate for a strong hash func-
tion is irrelevant with number of bits flipped in data, MemGuard design has better tolerance
for multi-bit errors.
6.3.4 Selection of Hash Function
In MemGuard, a hash function Hs is used to convert the (address, data) pair of a memory
request to a hash value before the multiset hash function is used. Hash functions are generally
classified as cryptographic ones and non-cryptographic ones. Cryptographic hash functions are
applied in secure applications and systems, i.e. MD4 [85], MD5 [86], SHA1 [46], SHA2 [30], etc.,
to protect the system from resourceful and malicious adversaries. They are typically complex
in computation and have a low throughput. For example, MD5 generates a 128-bit hash code
by four rounds of computation with 16 operations in each round. To the best of our knowledge,
the best FPGA and ASIC implementation report 0.73GB/s and 0.26GB/s throughput with cost
of 11,498 logic slices and 17,764 logic gates [41, 89], respectively. SHA1 is more complicated,
requiring four rounds of 20 operations each to generate a 160-bit hash code.
Memory error is completely disparate from the intentional malicious attacks. It is caused
by stochastic and unskilled cosmic rays, alpha particles and others. Therefore, simple and
cost effective non-cryptographic hash functions can be adopted in MemGuard. There exist
multiple non-cryptographic hash functions, for example Pearson Hashing [79], Fowler-Noll-
Vo(FNV) [23], CRC [81], MurmurHash [5], lookup3 [42], SpookyHash [43], CityHash [26] and
others. We still have to make a careful selection for performance and power efficiency.
Above all, the hash function should be collision resistant to provide a strong capability
of error detection. A strong hash function with m-bit output has a collision rate of 1/2m if
we assume the function produces each hash value with exactly the same probability. With
birthday attack, the rate increases to around 1/2
m
2 . Therefore, the selected hash function
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should be able to create output with a decent length. The original Pearson hashing algorithm
generates only 8-bit output, which cannot be adopted in this design. Second, the output hash
values need to follow uniform distribution independent of the distribution of inputs. Otherwise,
it will introduce clustering problem which can result in high collision rate. Third, a good hash
function is required to have a good level of avalanche effect. Avalanche effect presents the
ability for a hash function to produce a large change in output bits upon a minor modification
to input bits. The avalanche effect thus can dissipate minor modification in input data to a large
structure of output bits, which enhances error detection capability. Previous studies [20, 43]
present that lookup3 Hash, SpookyHash, MurmurHash and CityHash all have good properties
in avalanche effect.
In addition, the required hash function should be non-linear. Linear in this context means
Hs(A + B) = Hs(A) + Hs(B) mathematically, where A and B are two inputs, and + can
be general addition operation or binary xor operation. The reason is that it can introduce
high collision when apply to MSet-Add-Hash. Following Formula (6.1), the hash values of two
tampered data can cancel the modification out with a high possibility if the hash function
is linear. For example, given two data A and B, assume there is single bit error to both of
these data at the same bit position. Using A′ and B′ to denote the tampered data, we have
A + B = A′ + B′. Therefore, Hs(A′) + Hs(B′) = Hs(A) + Hs(B) even if a single-bit error in
data A and B creates great changes in their hash values, given a linear hash function. Thus,
CRC hash function can not be applied as CRC(A⊕B) = CRC(A)⊕ CRC(B).
Based on the criteria required, we opt for SpookyHash designed by Jenkins in 2011 [43].
SpookyHash produces well distributed 128-bit hash values for variable length of input. It has
been tested by the author for collision up to 272 key pairs, which presents a good collision
resistance. SpookyHash is said to achieve avalanches for 1-bit and 2-bit inputs which means
that any 1-bit or 2-bit change in inputs results in a flip in each output bit with 1/2 possibility.
In addition, SpookyHash is simple and fast and it costs merely 64-bit addition, xor and rotation
operations. SpookyHash classifies keys as short if the length of input is less than 192 bytes
and thus computes hash code with a simpler function. In MemGuard design, we combine each
64-byte data block with its address as an input key. The address is assumed to be 8 bytes
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with paddings to make a sufficiently large space. The input key size is thus 72 bytes, which is
regarded as short by SpookyHash.
The cost of SpookyHash compared to DDR3 main memory is minimal. We first carefully
scrutinize SpookyHash function and observe that it takes 45 64-bit addition operations, 35 xor
and 35 rotation operations to do the hashing. A previous study [66] presents that the energy
consumption of a 64-bit adder with 65nm process is 8.2 pJ. Using this number, we calculate
that SpookyHash consumes less than 1.0 nJ for each hashing operation. On the other hand,
DDR3 memory power calculation is well established by Micron [70]. A complete memory access
cycle includes precharge, activation, I/O drive and termination, and data transfer operations.
In addition, there is consecutive background power consumption and it is increasing as the
number of DRAM devices in a system grows. Taking Micron MT41J256M8 [69] device as
an example, an eight x8 DIMM can consume 62.0 nJ energy for a complete memory access
cycle. The energy consumption of a real system can be higher as it conventionally comprises
multiple channels with multiple DIMMs per channel. Therefore, the energy consumption for
SpookyHash is almost negligible compared to that of the DRAM access.
6.3.5 Checkpointing Mechanism for Error Recovery
In MemGuard design, errors in the program can be efficiently detected. We turn to OS-
based checkpointing mechanism for error recovery. Checkpointing method has been studied for
decades [57, 82, 88, 53, 74] and most recent studies [49, 120, 21] discuss checkpointing recovery
scheme for failures in high performance computings (HPC). In general, checkpointing takes the
snapshot of entire state of a program at the moment it was taken. It thus maintains all the
necessary information for a process to restart from the checkpoint.
Upon an error, checkpoint recovery is initiated and the program is rolled back to the most
recent checkpoint. The program state is overwritten with the stored checkpoint state. In this
case, the computation back to the checkpoint is discarded and the system pays the performance
overhead for error recovery. The more frequent the checkpoints are taken, the less the rollback
overhead. However, checkpointing itself introduces penalty as it requires time and storage
to generate the checkpoints. Book [53] presents an analytical model of checkpointing and
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discusses in detail of checkpointing placement issue and its optimization. As a memory error
is an uncommon event, failure recovery is rarely called.
In MemGuard, the checkpointing frequency is lower than that of error checking frequency
as there is at least one error checking before checkpointing. There can be multiple memory
error checking in between two neighbor checkpoints to detect errors timely. Otherwise, the
system rollback overhead is high as error detection is delayed. In case of an error, the system is
rolled back to a most recent checkpoint. If error still exists, the OS can improve checkpointing
and integrity checking frequency to exactly capture errors in a shortened period. For repeating
failures, a system reconfiguration is required as it is highly possible to be a hard error.
6.3.6 Integrity-Check Optimization and Other Discussions
The integrity check step in Algorithm 2 requires to scan the entire memory space ever
allocated to the process if the data block is not presented in cache. Although integrity check
period can be prolonged and it will not affect reliability much, the checking frequency may be
limited by practical requirement, i.e. error detection is required before each checkpointing. In
such cases, integrity check can introduce visible overhead if the allocated memory space is
significantly large. We further propose lazy-scan or also called touched-only scan scheme to
reduce the scan overhead. The lazy-scan scheme only fetches pages that have been touched
during an integrity checking period instead of all the pages allocated to the process. Typically,
the required memory space is allocated at very beginning while merely part of them is touched
during a period. Therefore, a lazy-scan will significantly reduce the memory traffic. Current
processors can already provide the information to the OS.
In order to guarantee that all the allocated memory pages will be added into ReadHash
for hash comparison, the hashes of all the untouched pages are still required. We thus propose
to maintain a 128-bit (16-byte) sum hash for each memory page. In integrity check step,
hashes for untouched pages are added into ReadHash directly and hashes for touched pages
are calculated based on the fetched data blocks from main memory. A 128-bit hash can be
applied for each page or a group of pages to reduce the cost with penalty of possibly increased
touched page size. The lazy-scan scheme has an additional advantage that it only detects
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Real Machine Configuration
Processor Intel Xeon E5520 Quadcore 2.26GHz
OS kernel Linux 2.6.27.6-117.fc10.x86 64
Compiler GCC 4.6.2
L1 caches (per core) 32KB Inst/32KB Data, 8-way, 64B line
L2 caches (per core) 256KB unified, 8-way, 64B line
L3 cache (shared) 8MB, 8-way, 64B line
Memory DDR3-1066 2DIMMs with 2GB/DIMM
Marss Simulator Configuration
Processor 1 ooo core, 4GHz,14-stage pipeline
Functional units 2 IntALU, 4 LSU, 2 FPALU
IQ, ROB and LSQ IQ 32, ROB 128, LQ 48, SQ 44
Physical registers 128 Int, 128 FP, 128 BR, 128 ST
L1 caches (per core) 64KB Inst/64KB Data, 2-way, 16B line
L2 cache (shared) 8MB, 8-way, 64B line
Memory 4GB, 200 cycles latency
Table 6.1: Major configuration parameters.
errors in program correction related pages and the untouched pages are assumed to be correct
as they are not read from main memory again. This can reduce program recovery rate as OS
may allocate a large memory space for some applications while the actually used is small. For
example, 434.zeusmp from SPEC CPU2006 allocates 1131MB of virtual memory but only uses
502MB in its lifetime following our experiment in Section 6.5.
In practice, MemGuard can be applied in combination with an SECDED scheme as single-
bit errors are most common. In this case, all single-bit errors can be corrected by SECDED
and it reduces the overhead for checkpointing rollback recovery caused by single-bit errors.
For example, high-performance computing servers can both adopt SECDED and MemGuard
design to avoid most common single-bit errors and detect multiple-bit errors. With MemGuard
design, it saves the computation overhead as errors can be efficiently detected. For consumer
level computers and mobile systems without ECC, MemGuard design can be employed to
efficiently provide error protection.
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6.4 Experimental Methodologies
We build a memory request generator to generate synthetic traces of memory write and
read for reliability evaluation. A configurable error injector is built to inject specific errors into
the memory traces to evaluate the error detection capability of proposed MemGuard scheme
and conventional SECDED design. SECDED is implemented following the reference design
RD1025 [93] from Lattice Semiconductor and SpookyHash function is implemented using open
source code [43]. To evaluate SECDED, we inject specific error types into each memory request
and use SECDED to detect the error. The experiment is repeated by 1 billion times and then
the error detection ratio is reported. For MemGuard, we generate 1 and 10 billion memory
requests and inject specific errors to evaluate MemGuard error detection probability. The
experiment is repeated for 100 times and the average error detection ratio is reported.
In order to evaluate system performance overhead introduced by MemGuard design, par-
ticularly from the integrity check step, we run all 26 compilable benchmarks from SPEC
CPU2006 suite [98] with different input-sets till the end on a real machine. The machine uses
an Intel Xeon E5520 2.26GHz processor of 8MB last level cache and 4GB main memory. The
detailed configuration is described in Table 6.1. We follow the study [29] to collect virtual and
physical memory sizes for the total 51 benchmark-input sets to estimate memory scan overhead.
In addition, we use a full system simulator Marss-x86 [78] to further study the introduced
memory traffic by MemGuard. Marss is an x86-64 architecture based cycle accurate simulator
and its detailed configuration is also listed in Table 6.1. We run 26 benchmark-input sets on
Marss for 10 billion instructions to collect memory traffic for baseline machine and estimate
extra memory traffic caused by MemGuard.
6.5 Experimental Results
6.5.1 Reliability Study
We study error detection capability of MemGuard design and SECDED from two aspects.
The analytical results are based on our error model and mathematical deduction presented in
Section 6.3.3 while simulated results rely on synthetic memory traces and error injection.
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Figure 6.2: Error detection failure rate comparison of MemGuard and SECDED. The higher
the bar the lower the error un-detectable rate.
6.5.1.1 Analytical Error Detection Rate
We calculate the error detection capability of MemGuard and SECDED design following
the analytical model discussed in Section 6.3.3 for 25,000 and 70,000 FIT, respectively. In the
calculation, we vary the time period t from 1 to 1,000 seconds and number of requests N from
1 to 1,000 billion. Figure 6.2 presents the results. The y-axis is reversed log-based to make the
figure readable and thus the higher the bar the lower the error un-detectable rate.
It is obvious that for all these cases, our proposed MemGuard design is orders of magnitude
stronger than conventional SECDED in error detection capability. The reason is that the strong
hash function presents a low collision rate of 1
2128
. With the number of requests in a checking
period grows, the error detection capability decreases slightly due to possibly increased collision
by addition operation. However, the error detection rate is mainly decided by collision rate
of the selected hash and the decrease is gradually attenuated. Therefore, the error checking
frequency of MemGuard design can be prolonged almost arbitrarily without much loss of re-
liability. As SECDED protection detects error in each request, its error detection rate almost
keeps constant in this case.
As the time period t grows from 1 to 1,000 seconds, error rate for each bit in a data
block grows, which increases multi-bit (> 2) error rate. Therefore, SECDED error detection
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Figure 6.3: SECDED error protection capability. Note that although SECDED can fully report
that error occurs for odd-bit (>1) errors, it might mistakenly recognize them as single-bit errors
and correct them incorrectly.
capability is reduced significantly. However, in MemGuard, it employs strong hash function of
which the collision rate is irrelevant with number of flips in a data block. As the error rate for
each data block grows, error detection capability reduces slightly for MemGuard design since
the number of tampered data blocks increases and thus the collision possibility. However, the
decreasing rate is lower than that of SECDED.
We do not present results data for Chipkill Correct as the computation exceeds the precision.
However, we expect that MemGuard design can be stronger than Chipkill Correct. The reason
is that the error detection capability of Chipkill Correct is closely related to multi-bit error rate
while MemGuard design is not. As errors are usually correlated in real world [33], undetectable
error rate can be high and Chipkill Correct may fail. As MemGuard design is highly correlated
to the reliability of hash function itself, it can be more reliable than Chipkill Correct in error
detection given that a strong hash function is carefully selected.
6.5.1.2 Simulated Error Detection Rate
For SECDED protection, we inject 1 to 10 bits of errors to a 64-bit data block at random
positions and apply SECDED to detect the error. The experiment is repeated for a billion
times to report error detection rate. Figure 6.3 presents the results. SECDED can completely
detect all single- and double- bit errors as it has a Hamming distance of 4. In addition, the
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Figure 6.4: Memory integrity-checking overhead of SPEC CPU2006 benchmark-input sets.
implemented SECDED code can detect all odd-bit errors similar to parity checking, which
counts the total number of ‘0’s or ‘1’s in the data. Any odd-bit flip will modify the even/odd
parity bit which can be detected. In theory, SECDED code cannot correct any errors with
more than one bits flipped. The particular SECDED implementation reports if error occurred.
If so, it simply identifies it is single-bit error or double-bit error no matter how many bits
flipped in the data block. For odd-bit (except 1-bit) errors, they will be mistakenly recognized
as double-bit errors with a 50% chance and the other 50% chance to be mistakenly recognized
as single-bit errors and corrected by SECDED incorrectly. In addition, SECDED can not fully
detect other even number of bits errors. The error detection rate is around 99.2% and all of
them are mistakenly recognized as double-bit errors by implemented SECDED.
For MemGuard design, we inject one, two, three, four, five, ten, 100 and 1000 errors into
1 billion and 10 billion memory requests, separately. We group errors into six categories:
single-, double-, triple-, quad-, multi- (randomly generated > 4) bit and mixed (of these five)
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errors. The experiment is repeated for 100 times. We did not present the result figure as
MemGuard design yields 100% error detection rate across all of our experiments. In reality,
the probability of error detection is not 100% but is too high for a false negative to be observed
in the experiments. Although the repeat times are limited to 100, we believe the results
are representative as SpookyHash itself performs great in collision resistance (passing through
272 ≈ 1021 key pair test by the author).
The high reliability of MemGuard in memory error detection comes from the applied hash
function. As illustrated, MemGuard design with SpookyHash is stronger than conventional
SECDED error protection. A hash function with higher collision resistance can further improve
its reliability. Given that Chipkill Correct may fail when multi-bit error rate is high, MemGuard
design can be stronger than Chipkill Correct in error detection, and it is designed to be irrelevant
to number of flips in a data block.
6.5.2 System Performance Study
In MemGuard design, the major overhead to system performance is to scan allocated mem-
ory space during integrity check. We thus estimate memory scan overhead and compare it to
the program execution time. We run all the executable benchmark-input sets on a real machine
to obtain the program execution time and collect the allocated virtual memory space following
a previous study [29] to estimate memory scan latency. As memory scanning has great page
locality, we assume that each 64-byte memory block takes 5ns for DDR3-1600 DRAM memory.
Figure 6.4 describes the results. Assume memory integrity checking is executed solely at
the end of a program, the scan overhead is minimal. As illustrated in Figure 6.4a, the program
execution time is orders of magnitude higher than memory scan time. On average, the program
execution time is 418 seconds while memory scan takes merely 0.03 seconds given that the
virtual memory space allocated is 372MB on average. In practice, the low integrity checking
frequency can increase checkpointing recovery overhead as errors are delayed to detect. We
thus assume the checking is activated every 10 billion instructions and Figure 6.4b presents
the results. For SPEC 2006 benchmarks, the average execution time is 4.35 seconds for 10
billion instructions and memory scan overhead keeps unchanged, which is approximately 0.7%
111
0E
00
2
0E
00
8
0E
01
3
0E
02
4
0E
05
9
0E
06
4
0E
09
4
0E
18
0
0E
30
9
0E
35
7
0E
54
0
0E
54
3
0E
55
2
1E
51
9
3E
25
9
3E
77
9
3E
91
2
6E
28
8
10
E3
75 18
E1
29
20
E4
08
25
E5
24
25
E8
87
30
E6
59
36
E4
8 41
po
vr
ay
ga
m
es
sE
cy
to
sin
e
to
nt
o
h2
64
re
fEb
as
el
in
e
bz
ip
2E
in
pu
t
na
m
d
gr
om
ac
s
hm
m
er
En
ph
3
ca
lc
ul
ix
om
ne
tp
p
sje
ng
go
bm
kE
13
x1
3
xa
la
nc
bm
k
gc
c
as
ta
rEb
ig
La
ke
ca
ct
us
AD
M
sp
hi
nx
3
ze
us
m
p
so
pl
ex
Ep
ds
bw
av
es
le
sli
e3
d
lb
m
m
ilc
ge
m
sF
DT
D
m
cf
lib
qu
an
tu
m
ILP MED MEM
memorydaccesdperd1000dinstructions
Figure 6.5: SPEC 2006 memory traffic characterizations.
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Figure 6.6: Comparison of touched memory blocks, touched memory pages in 10 billion in-
structions and used physical memory space and allocated virtual memory space during its
lifetime.
of the execution time. Therefore, as long as the integrity checking rate is greater than 10 billion
instructions, the system performance overhead is negligible.
In the case that the application has a large memory footprint and integrity checking fre-
quency is required to be high by practice, lazy-scan scheme can help reduce scan overhead as
only the touched pages are required to read from main memory. As the checking period is
short, the touched page size is comparatively small. lazy-scan will significantly save the cost
and we can see the results from next section.
6.5.3 Memory Traffic Overhead
We assume that the memory error checking frequency is every 10 billion instructions to
study memory traffic overhead and proposed lazy-scan scheme. We first use the Marss-x86
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Figure 6.7: MemGuard introduced memory traffic overhead by integrity checking.
simulator to characterize memory traffic of each SPEC 2006 benchmark without error pro-
tection. We group the benchmarks into three categories: ILP (computation-intensive), MED
(medium) and MEM (memory-intensive) based on MPKI. We define MPKI as memory accesses
per 1,000 instructions and ILP benchmarks are those with MPKI less than 1.0. MEM are those
that MPKI is greater than 10.0 and MED are those in between the two. Figure 6.5 presents
the results. Typically, MEM benchmarks are memory power hungry as they access memory
frequently and consume significant operation power, read/write power and IO power.
Figure 6.6 compares the actually touched memory pages in 10 billion instructions, the used
physical memory space (RSS: resident set size) and allocated memory space (VSZ: virtual
memory size) during its entire lifetime. The physical and virtual memory spaces are mostly
consistent with several large exceptions, i.e. gamess, zeusmp, etc. For gamess with cytosine
workload, it allocates 651 MB virtual memory and the actual physical memory usage is merely
6.5MB. In addition, across all the benchmarks, the actually touched pages are smaller than total
allocated memory space. The reduction is from 201.9MB for VSZ to 47.1MB, from 555.8MB
to 199.3MB and from 609.8MB to 552.1MB on average for ILP, MED and MEM, respectively.
Therefore, lazy-scan can effectively reduce memory traffic overhead.
Figure 6.7 presents the introduced memory traffic of MemGuard design. We limit the y-
axis less than 2.0 to make the figure readable and table all data in case it is out of range.
For ILP workloads, MemGuard design will introduce 13x memory traffic on average if entire
VSZ is scanned. By scanning RSS and touched pages, the overhead is reduced to 2x and 31%,
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respectively. As ILP workloads are computation intensive, their memory power consumption is
not significant. For MEM workloads, the extra memory traffic is 3.8% and 3.7%, respectively,
by scanning VSZ and RSS. The cost is further reduced to 3.4% if lazy-scan is applied. This
cost is less than conventional SECDED design, which introduces 12.5% overhead. As memory
scanning presents a good amount of page localities, the practical power consumption can be
lower than traffic overhead. For MED workloads, the overhead is 23.3% by scanning VSZ and
it can be reduced to 7.2% by lazy-scan. The overhead is also lower than conventional SECDED
design. Note that the reported overhead from MemGuard is based on the assumption that
the error checking is executed every 10 billion instructions. The checking period can be much
longer than that, which will further reduce the overhead.
The figure also compares the actually touched memory data blocks with touched memory
pages. On average, the introduced memory traffic can be reduced from 31% to 20%, from
7.2% to 6.9% and from 3.4% to 3.2% for ILP, MED and MEM workloads, respectively. By
scanning touched blocks instead of touched pages, the overhead can be further reduced. Also,
as discussed previously, scanning RSS can reduce the overhead compared to scanning VSZ.
6.6 Summary
We have presented MemGuard, a system level error protection scheme for main memory
system. The scheme is independent of DRAM organizations and isolated in memory system
level. Based on WriteHash and ReadHash comparison, the scheme can effectively detect
errors in a sequence of memory requests. A detailed analysis of reliability capability and
selection of hash functions are presented. The evaluation using mathematical deduction and
synthetic simulation proves that MemGuard design is more reliable than conventional SECDED
design with lower performance and power overhead given that a strong hash function is carefully
selected. The MemGuard design is independent of main memory organizations and the scheme
is reliable, effective and power efficient.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Memory error has been a great concern for years. It may lead to severe consequences
like data corruption, program and system crashes, and security vulnerabilities in worst case,
without error protection. On the other hand, the performance and power consumption are
other major considerations in memory system design. As conventional memory reliability de-
sign introduces significant storage, cost and power overhead, we develop novel error protection
schemes for memory systems taking into considerations of reliability, power efficiency and sys-
tem performance.
We first present E3CC, a complete solution of memory error protection for sub-ranked and
narrow-ranked low-power memories. It breaks the rigidity of conventional reliability design
by embedding ECC into DRAM devices. In the design, we propose a novel address mapping
scheme called BCRM to resolve the address mapping issue efficiently. The design is flexible,
efficient, and compatible to conventional non-ECC DIMMs. Secondly, we further explore the
address mapping schemes to support selective error protection, which selectively protect critical
data only. It thus reduces the inherent overhead with uniform reliability design. All the
proposed address mappings are based on modulo operation and they are proved to be efficient.
Such mappings facilitate selective protection and thus further improve system power efficiency.
Thirdly, we propose Free ECC design for compressed last-level cache. It embeds ECC/EDC
into the unused fragments in compressed cache so that the dedicated storage is removed, which
is required in conventional reliability design. The design thus improves cache power efficiency.
In the end, we propose MemGuard design, a system level error protection scheme for main
memory system. It is independent of DRAM organizations and isolated in memory system
level. Based on incremental hashing scheme for a sequence of memory requests, MemGuard
design is demonstrated to be stronger than SECDED in error detection. The scheme is reliable,
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effective and power efficient.
All these proposed schemes to main memory protection are flexible and they require no
modifications to motherboard or memory modules. They can be selectively applied to a wide
spectrum of computer systems. For mobile systems like smartphones and tablets without er-
ror protection, the proposed E3CC, selective error protection and MemGuard schemes can all
be applied. As the designs are flexible and compatible with conventional non-ECC memo-
ries, the system can be booted with ECC protection for reliability or without ECC for power
efficiency. For personal computers like desktop and laptops, all the schemes are efficient to
provide error protection without upgrading motherboard to support expensive ECC-DIMM.
For large-scale high-performance servers and datacenters, MemGuard design can be employed
for stronger error detection capability. It detects error from a system level while introduces
minimal overhead.
Throughout the dissertation, we have designed and demonstrated flexible, cost-effective,
and power-efficient reliability design. In future, we can further explore our studies on real
machines. First, we can evaluate our proposed address mapping schemes to study their effects
on distributing memory requests. Second, we can implement the selective error protection on
a real mobile system like a smartphone, through user-defined programming. We can mark the
critical data and variables by analyzing the program source code and modify the compiler to
facilitate placing the data into protected memory region. We can further build an error injector
to test its system reliability. Similar to Free ECC design to last-level cache, we can explore the
unused fragments with compression techniques in main memory systems.
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